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Abstract 
 
While the absurd is usually associated with the modern subject, it is the purpose of this 
project to show how it is still relevant today. The concepts of end times, ecological 
disaster, and post-democracy are pressing concerns of the new millennium that emphasise 
the futility of being and a lack of political agency. Absurdity describes a similar condition, 
the feeling of purposelessness that results from the observation that life has no inherent 
meaning. A fundamentally modern condition of religious dispossession, this feeling is 
predominantly frustration, since it is impossible to determine the meaning of life through 
reason. In these cases, crisis seems unavoidable, insurmountable, and permanent, and these 
attitudes can be observed in works of art since modernism. The thesis aims to define the 
absurd by the special examination of works closely associated with the concept, which will 
allow the identification of a specific literary and artistic tradition originating in the 
nineteenth century and continuing to the present. This is achieved through the rigorous 
examination of works by Søren Kierkegaard, Albert Camus, Michel Houellebecq, and 
Bruce Nauman. Despite the fact that works reflecting the absurd respond to distinct 
historical conditions, they all express frustration at the limitations of human agency, and 
the incomprehensibility of life.   
 
The accompanying artwork consists of two distinct bodies of video performance. Both 
present actions that permanently and inexorably oppose their context, and as such 
epitomise the conflict inherent to the absurd. Similar to the texts and artworks discussed in 
the thesis, these performances are motivated by a sense of frustration and futility stemming 
from the crises of the new millennium, and the similarities between this condition and the 
absurd. The first series features Dr Nobody, a performance alter ego whose attempts at 
activism consistently fail to exceed the trivia of his personal life. In long, convoluted online 
video monologues he cites the many annoyances of the everyday and his various theories 
as to their causes, rarely reaching a conclusion. The second body of work presents the 
repetitive and pointless gestures of a nameless, suit-clad figure. These videos are produced 
to make them as engaging as possible, using changing camera angles, sound effects, and 
attractively coloured backgrounds that try to emphasise the importance of their rather 
trivial contents. In different ways both series insist on pointless activity, and in doing so 
allegorise the futility, frustration, and absurdity of the contemporary condition. 
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Introduction 
 
Before the second semester of 2005 my work was directly political, environmentalist, 
and countercultural. It seemed that the crises of contemporary civilisation were multiplying in 
number and increasing in scale before a largely apathetic public, so I made art that aimed to 
enlighten them. Although somewhat naïve, and a little pompous, these works voiced concerns 
that are still relevant today because they involve problems that are the same if not worse. While 
these predicaments are real and worthy of concern, it took years of making work that appealed 
for action and change before it became clear that, from a personal perspective, these problems 
seemed insoluble. This realisation then gave rise to a new predicament—a crisis of social 
agency, personal insignificance, and logical paradox. It was a dead end, and it seemed that this 
dead end would be a more appropriate subject for my work. This decision soon led to a body 
of performance videos that centred on a nameless figure in a business suit and tie engaged in 
patently futile tasks, such as standing waist deep in water and warding off rain with an 
umbrella, or trying to put out a raging fire with a tiny kitchen spray bottle—all with the footage 
looped so that they appeared to go on forever. Due to the utter ineffectiveness of the tasks, 
their lack of narrative, and the strong symbolism of the costume, the works elicited 
comparison with the concept of the absurd in philosophy and literature. In the subsequent 
years, with further reading, it became clear that this emphasis on impasse was mirrored in this 
concept and the writings that dealt with it. The absurd is also about frustration, critique and 
doubt, and an inability to understand the world, all that has changed is time and context.   
Even though the absurd is a fundamentally modern condition it denotes a crisis that is 
relevant to the present. Due to its familiarity within the discourses around existentialism, from 
the writings of the agnostic Søren Kierkegaard to the atheist Albert Camus, the absurd is 
generally understood as the problem of the meaning of life outside religion. The absurd results 
from the attempted marriage of two disparate elements, creating an unsolvable contradiction. 
Traditionally this conflict is between a desire for existential meaning and the inability to 
ascertain that meaning through reason—the meaning of life provided by religion cannot be 
replaced by any logical thought process, since the assertions of religion are irrational. The 
condition of absurdity is the result of this opposition: it is a feeling of despair that life is 
meaningless, and frustration at our futility of being and lack of agency. Similar crises are 
observable in the contemporary world, for example the alienating nature of current democratic 
politics, the threat imposed by climate change and deferral of any significant response, and the 
2 
 
potentially catastrophic results of deregulated capitalism.1 Because these issues are 
overwhelmingly complex, and their resolution seems impossible, they emphasise a sense of 
alienation, insignificance, and frustration at contemporary circumstances. Given the similarities 
between the experience of the present world and the crisis of the absurd it is possible to draw a 
comparison between the two, and it is the aim of the present study to demonstrate how this is 
possible in works of art. In order to achieve this, the absurd will be defined in the work of 
modern foundational thinkers, and then examined in successive works of visual art and 
literature that share a sense of futility and frustration at the attempt to understand life. By 
establishing the absurd as a distinct literary and artistic tradition, one that continues to the 
present, this study proposes its continued relevance.  
Because the condition of the absurd is usually associated with writers active between 
the mid-nineteenth and twentieth centuries, an important problem for this study is whether it 
has a place in the contemporary. Since it entails the question of a fundamental meaning to 
existence outside political and religious ideology, the absurd implies the criticism of established 
ideas and beliefs in a manner that is exemplary of modernist critique. In his seminal analysis of 
the psychology of the avant-garde, Renato Poggioli notes that such work critiques the status 
quo by posing risky alternatives, thus expanding and progressing culture. Because the avant-
garde’s work is new and challenging they implicitly critique the status quo, and their work is of 
such defiance that it estranges, or alienates, them from the dominant culture. However, this 
new and challenging work can become recognised and later absorbed by the culture it 
comments on.2 In the case of the absurd it may seem that this process has run its course, since 
the concept is dated and atheistic attitudes are quite common, whether they are reflective or 
not. However, the argument that the absurd is still relevant implies a degree of similarity 
between the modern and contemporary, and therefore the manner in which the world has 
changed is important when considering the absurd in current times.  
The conditions of contemporary society and modern society are different, since avant-
garde values of engaged but distanced critique seem to have been absorbed by late capitalism. 
In First as Tragedy, Then as Farce (2009) Slavoj Zizek examines the way that similar critiques, 
such as that of alienated consumption, are now integrated with the process of consumption 
																																																						
1 Colin Crouch, Post-Democracy (Cambridge: Polity, 2004), 4; Naomi Klein, This Changes 
Everything: Capitalism Vs. The Climate (Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), 4; Slavoj Zizek, Living 
in the End Times (London: Verso, 2011), x. 
2 Renato Poggioli, The Theory of the Avant-Garde, trans. Gerald Fitzgerald (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1968), 117-18. 
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itself.3 Alienated consumption is the phenomenon in which consumer society is pacified and 
alienated by relentless bombardment with, and consumption of, commodities—whereas 
previously production and consumption involved both necessity and use value, and a sense of 
agency in the process.4 Zizek points out that this latter twentieth-century critique has been 
integrated by capitalism in a phenomenon that he calls ‘ethical consumerism’, or ‘cultural 
capitalism’.5 This is exemplified by the ‘Starbucks Shared Planet’ program where a small 
portion of the sale price of a coffee is dispensed to support the developing nations that the 
coffee industry usually exploits.6 By buying the coffee, consumers are not only sustaining a free 
trade agreement that guarantees a reasonable price to producers, but also buying into an ethic 
of goodwill. The consumer is no longer isolated by the process of consumption, but is engaged 
with a sense of agency and usefulness, as well as an implicit critique of the repercussions of the 
capitalist system.7 The market can adapt to cater for all positions, and in doing so neutralise 
those of dissent.  
A similar absorption of critique and zeal into a marketable product can be seen in 
contemporary art. Drawing on Zizek’s observation, Adam Geczy describes how modernist 
critique now resides in the background, that it has been ‘sublimated’, as an implied aspect of all 
art.8 He argues that like Zizek’s formulation, where altruism and authentic experience are 
integrated into the product, criticality has similarly been integrated into the contemporary 
artistic product.9 What remains of modernist zeal has become somewhat diluted outside a 
distinct ideology—the pursuit of innovation and advancement is now without a political 
dimension, it has become simply the pursuit of novelty.10 Making art that is new and interesting 
is less driven by the ideal of cultural advancement, rather, it is increasingly what makes a 
contemporary artist’s work appealing to the market, and therefore, it is criticality that drives 
sales. Criticality has become incorporated with the idea of the artistic product, no less the 
																																																						
3 Slavoj Zizek, First as Tragedy, Then as Farce (London: Verso, 2009), 54. 
4 Gerd-Rainer Horn, The Spirit of ‘68: Rebellion in Western Europe and North America, 1956-1976 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 8-9; Greg Kennedy, An Ontology of Trash: The 
Disposable and Its Problematic Nature (New York: State University of New York Press, 2007), 103. 
5 Zizek, First as Tragedy, Then as Farce, 52-53. 
6 Zizek, Living in the End Times, 236. 
7 Zizek, First as Tragedy, Then as Farce, 54. 
8 Adam Geczy and Jacqueline Millner, Fashionable Art (London & New York: Bloomsbury 
Academic, 2015), 7. 
9 Ibid., 8. 
10 Ibid., 6-7. 
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defining factor of its worthiness for consumption and success.11 Like the way that altruism has 
become absorbed into the very act of consumption, as with Zizek’s Starbucks logic, criticality 
in art has become little more than ‘an invisible remainder that is synonymous with “being 
art”’.12 Therefore, if modern criticality is implied by the work of art itself, there seems little 
reason for contemporary works of art to be critical, or to engage with modernist themes. 
However, artists continue to be socially critical and innovative, and continue to make works 
that engage with modernist ideas and forms.  
Despite the many factors that separate the modern and contemporary world, art has a 
propensity to connect the past with the present through analysis and reflection. In a meditation 
on the nature of contemporary art, Boris Groys compares the different experiences of the 
present for the modern and contemporary subject, drawing some pertinent conclusions about 
how contemporary art relates to the modern. During modernity there was such excitement for 
the realisation of projects and ideals that the present was considered a hindrance, something 
that gets in the way of progress, an obstacle on the way to the future.13 Groys contrasts this 
attitude with the contemporary one, which is more hesitant given the widespread disbelief in 
these promises.14 For him, the present is a time in which we can pause and reconsider the 
modern projects, a time for analysis and not rapid advancement.15 Groys describes this 
‘contemporary’ time as an infinite, repetitive, ‘useless’ time, because the modern drive to the 
future is not as strong today. Without this drive, and with the benefit of hindsight, 
contemporary art can reflect on the modern, recontextualise it, and therefore assess its 
relevance and value today. According to Groys, rapid and meaningful change now seems 
unlikely and even suspicious, it is more the task of contemporary art to analyse and reconsider 
the concepts of the past. The contemporary is therefore conducive to both the feeling that 
progress is impossible, as well as the idea that the consideration of past concepts might permit 
a better understanding of our situation.  
A self-evident and rather crucial distinction between the modern and the contemporary 
is the fact that Western society is now in very different socio-political circumstances. Since 
modernity conceptions of truth, society, politics, and the self are increasingly questioned and 
																																																						
11 Ibid., 8. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Boris Groys, ‘Comrades of Time,’  e-flux, no. 11 (2009), http://www.e-
flux.com/journal/comrades-of-time/. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Idem. 
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exploded, along with an almost exponential growth in accessible knowledge due to recent 
developments in communication such as the Internet. But even within predominantly secular, 
globalised, and multicultural developed societies, the perpetuation of attitudes of political 
conservatism and religious fundamentalism illustrate that while society and culture have 
progressed, this progress is far from unqualified. A result of industrialisation is the capacity to 
feed, clothe and shelter the world’s population, but due to the inequality inherent to capitalism 
the populations of developing countries continue to languish in poverty. Since the Second 
World War, during so-called peace time where large-scale conflict is in abeyance, the world has 
almost constantly been at war, whether this is in the form of localised conflict or continued 
nuclear proliferation.16 While the conditions of the contemporary are certainly different to 
those of modernity, not everything has changed. Many of the old problems persist while many 
new ones appear. 
To give a better idea of the crises facing the contemporary subject it is worth citing a 
few specific examples. These are the type of situations that give one a sense of absurdity, since 
they seem at once urgent and insurmountable, and while the present study does not respond to 
them directly they do give an indication as to why it is conducted. The concept of post-
democracy as put forward by Colin Crouch accounts for the passivity and apathy of citizens in 
established democratic societies. He argues that due to the decline of the working class there is 
a significant reduction of political activity that directly represents the public interest. As a 
result, political debate in these democracies is a ‘tightly controlled spectacle’ between major 
parties whose agendas are increasingly catered toward the interests of ‘elites that 
overwhelmingly represent business interests’.17 In democracies, citizens are still able to vote in 
elections, however the issues that are presented and debated in the public eye are both selective 
and limited. For Crouch, politics is actually shaped by the interactions between governments 
and those with the resources to influence them, namely business lobbies.18 Due to the public’s 
limited role in shaping political matters that affect them, there is a pervasive sense of 
disillusionment and uninterest.19 In Crouch’s analysis, the contemporary subject’s experience of 
the current political climate is characterised by futility and a lack of agency. 
																																																						
16 Marianne Hanson, ‘The Failed Effort to Ban the Ultimate Weapon of Mass Destruction,’ The 
Conversation, June 8, 2015, https://theconversation.com/the-failed-effort-to-ban-the-ultimate-
weapon-of-mass-destruction-42722. 
17 Crouch, Post-Democracy, 4. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid., 2-4. 
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For others, the current political, economic, and ecological situation is both 
irremediable and leading towards an unavoidable catastrophe. In his aptly titled book, Living in 
the End Times (2010), Zizek sets out how the global capitalist system is approaching an 
‘apocalyptic zero-point’.20 This crisis is signalled by four factors—the impending ecological 
catastrophe associated with global warming, potential fundamental changes with human 
identity and self-awareness as a result of genetic engineering, problems within the system that 
can weaken it (such as the global financial crisis and decline in raw materials), and finally, the 
widening gap between rich and poor and its radical effects for governments in developing 
countries.21 Zizek analyses these symptoms in a structure corresponding to the five stages of 
grief developed by psychologist Elisabeth Kubler-Ross. Not only is this structure witty and 
useful, since these stages of grief apply to patients who have just learned that they are 
terminally ill, it also reinforces Zizek’s position that the coming catastrophe is unavoidable, and 
also that in our current state we are both implicated and powerless.22 Kubler-Ross’ final stage 
of grief is acceptance, and Zizek emphasises that while accepting this self-imposed catastrophe 
implies a certain degree of resignation, this is a necessary first step—before it can be addressed 
it must be acknowledged, and as he puts it, ‘fully lived’.23  
Probably the most evident crisis faced by the contemporary world is climate change. 
This is, of course, one of Zizek’s concerns, but is significant enough to warrant its own 
address. As Naomi Klein points out in This Changes Everything (2014), the fact that the global 
climate is being affected as a direct result of human activity has not only been known for some 
time, it is also plainly obvious in everyday life.24 Despite this rather common knowledge, 
carbon output in developed nations is increasing, and instead of moving away from hazardous 
fossil fuel sources Western countries are actively searching for new and more crude ones.25 She 
uses the psychological term ‘cognitive dissonance’ (discomfort caused by having contradictory 
ideas, beliefs or aims) to describe this resignation, and to illustrate that addressing climate 
change requires action that is fundamentally at odds with the current system of deregulated 
capitalism.26 The threat of ecological disaster and need for action has grown in tandem with 
																																																						
20 Zizek, Living in the End Times, x. 
21 Ibid., x-xi. 
22 Ibid., xii-xiii. 
23 Ibid., xii. 
24 Klein, This Changes Everything: Capitalism Vs. The Climate, 2. 
25 Ibid., 2-3. 
26 Ibid., 3, 16-17. 
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globalised trade and mass consumption, and with it the massive exploitation of resources.27 
Because these factors are inextricable from one another, Klein suggests that the only way to 
sufficiently address climate change is to reverse the dominant ideological and economic model 
of our time, to stress contraction rather than growth.28 Klein’s assessment is accurate, and 
while her solution is conceivable it is also drastic. Without seeming pessimistic, the prospect of 
a rapid remodelling of our economic and political system is becoming less realistic. Currently, 
there seems to be no feasible solution, and from an individual perspective there is an 
overwhelming sense of frustration and disempowerment. 
While these pressing concerns of the new millennium have had a role in stimulating 
this study, they are not the ones that are discussed at length within it. The above crises are 
simply examples from the current time that mirror the existential crisis of the absurd. These 
problems demonstrate how the absurd is relevant to the contemporary world and serve to 
introduce to this case study its relevance to recent literature and art. In order to achieve this, it 
is necessary to first outline how the absurd developed as a concept in the work of its 
foundational thinkers, then it will be possible to explain its relevance to more recent examples.  
The discussion of the absurd as a specific philosophical idea originates in Søren 
Kierkegaard’s works. He uses the term to illustrate the crisis of belief and reason that Christian 
faith involves. According to Kierkegaard, in order to have faith one must be able to genuinely 
accept the irrational assertions of Christian doctrine. Because many of the core tenets of 
Christianity are physically and logically impossible, they are absurd to comprehend. But this 
does not mean that they can be lightly dismissed, as they form the core of one’s understanding 
of the nature of existence, morality, duty, and the meaning of life. Christianity therefore 
involves a paradox where the subjective desire to understand life encounters the logical 
impossibility of the teachings that explain it, and the absurd describes the exact point where 
the mind rejects them. Kierkegaard asserts that the only way that the absurd can be overcome 
is by embracing ‘subjective truth’, and making a ‘leap of faith’, to overcome the objective mind, 
but notes that this is rarely, if ever, achieved. In effect, Kierkegaard argues against the 
plausibility of Christianity, and in doing so discredits the sense of purpose and meaning it 
engenders in personal life. Kierkegaard uses the concept of the absurd to describe the precise 
point at which faith becomes untenable, and therefore in crisis. 
																																																						
27 Ibid., 16-19. 
28 Ibid., 19-20. 
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The work of Albert Camus reinterprets the absurd during and after the Second World 
War. In the wake of a loss of faith, religious and otherwise, and set against the devastation of 
the war, Nazi occupation, and the horrific results of mass ideology, he poses the question as to 
whether there is any justifiable reason against suicide. He suggests that the search for this 
reason is the only thing worth living for, even if an answer is unlikely. The inability of humans 
to make sense of their own life is what he describes as the absurd. It is the contradiction that 
arises between the desire for existential meaning and the inability to find any. Camus’s idea of 
the absurd admits that life is ostensibly meaningless, although he is careful to avoid nihilism. 
Rather, his absurdist philosophy aims for a sense of individual and collective agency. He argues 
that while life is a futile struggle to find meaning, there is meaning to be found in the struggle 
itself. He famously uses the Greek myth of Sisyphus as a metaphor for this idea. Sisyphus is 
condemned by the gods to ceaselessly roll a boulder up a hill again and again, and he continues 
despite the pointlessness of his arduous task. Camus’s point is that while life is a futile and 
meaningless struggle we must endure it with the same heroic resolution as Sisyphus. 
Fifty years later, the fiction of Michel Houellebecq portrays life in a similar, albeit more 
bleak manner. He describes contemporary existence as meaningless, and the pursuit of 
happiness as futile and hollow. The idea of happiness is itself deemed an absurdity. His prose 
lacks Camus’s heroic tone, instead presenting a bitter complaint about the manifold 
disappointments of postmodern life. He depicts a society that, in lieu of religious commitment, 
has elevated individual aspiration above all else. The esoteric bonds that sustained families and 
imbued life with a sense of meaning no longer have any effect. Despite his characters’ many 
attempts at personal fulfilment and love, their personal lives remain emotionally destitute, and 
most of them struggle with depression. Emotional and sexual relationships are brief, 
superficial, and competitive—and when his characters occasionally do find love it is either 
accompanied by loss or the feeling is fleeting. Old age only brings bodily embarrassment and 
abandonment, and many people choose suicide or voluntary euthanasia. Tracing the lineage of 
what he describes as the rise of the individual from the Enlightenment to the contemporary, 
Houellebecq presents the paradoxes and disappointments of existence when self-interest is 
taken as a guiding principle. While Houellebecq’s portrayal of life does not share Camus’s 
consolations, it follows the same tradition, insofar as his frustration with its meaninglessness.  
While Houellebecq’s work is a good example of the absurdity of the contemporary 
world, it is only one such example. Houellebecq makes it clear that, despite the advancements 
of modernity, the structure of contemporary society makes individual life prone to crisis, and 
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he makes this particularly clear in his work by focusing on extremes. Houellebecq’s work 
illuminates how the central ideas of the absurd—the loss of faith, the belief in human capacity 
for self-determination, and the meaninglessness of life that results—manifest now, and he 
illustrates this with excoriating detail. Although this is an excellent example to demonstrate the 
relevance of the absurd today, there are other ways in which its influence endures. Bruce 
Nauman’s work is best understood as the product of his navigation of the doubts, 
contradictions, and frustrations that attend both the role of the artist and the human 
experience. His engagement with the absurd is so consistent and thorough that this study 
focuses entirely on his art with the exclusion of all others, particularly because he seems to 
appreciate the absurd for his own reasons, making the case for the contemporary absurd 
stronger.  
Nauman has an almost absurdist approach to being an artist and making art. His work 
is not often influenced by that of other artists and it is difficult to ascribe it to a distinct 
movement or category, rather, he prefers to approach each artwork as though it is the first one 
he has ever made. As a result, Nauman’s rigorously independent method and attitude involves 
a constant struggle to invent new meaning. In these struggles, the artist often finds himself 
alone in the studio with no idea as to what to do next, often resorting to filming himself 
engaged in pointless tasks that are arduously repetitive and prolonged. Fittingly, he has 
mentioned his admiration for Samuel Beckett’s work, which is frequently compared with 
Camus’s, allowing Nauman’s common interests to be aligned as well. Nauman’s deliberately 
baffling installations seem to imitate the absurd universe, because they prevent the viewer from 
determining a clear meaning, providing the impression that they are lacking the required 
information to understand. Nauman’s works also articulate his general existential frustration, 
not with transcendental meanings or truths, but human nature and behaviour, which he sees as 
both shamefully brutal and admirably complex. Nauman therefore engages with the absurd 
because it is conducive to his ideas about life, meaning that he uses the absurd in another 
context, and for his own reasons. He presents a consistent and timeless example of how 
human beings are prone to absurdity, that nothing can be certain with regard to human 
thought and behavior. 
*** 
Anyone with an interest in theatre and literature would have come to the absurd 
through Martin Esslin’s study of modernist drama, The Theatre of the Absurd (1961). Perhaps the 
most-cited work dealing with the concept in artistic form, it has given the term ‘absurd’ 
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everyday currency. While having its roots in the anti-Hegelian, dialectical philosophy of 
Kierkegaard, the absurd has come to embody a specific postwar condition of disillusionment 
and disempowerment, and this is largely a result of Esslin’s text. Placing a rather abstract 
philosophical concept in terms of concrete and vivid stage images, the work struck a chord 
with the protest generation, for whom the original certainties of Western culture and the 
optimism of various civil movements were increasingly being made unavailable or suppressed. 
At the same time, entrenched beliefs surrounding race, gender and marriage were being 
challenged and exploded, adding to the appeal of a text dealing with a concept about the 
struggle for independent thought and meaning.  
Despite, and in many ways because of, its massive influence, Esslin’s book will not be 
discussed in the present study. Although it has become emblematic of the concept of the 
absurd, the book is confined to a narrow group of dramatists operating in the middle of the 
twentieth century.29 Predominantly about theatre, the book discusses attributes of the absurd 
with reference to specific plays, and as a result does not permit comparison with the works 
under examination without extensive interpretation—it is much more efficient to consult the 
original texts. Esslin also presents a thorough discussion of the work of Samuel Beckett, 
which, owing to the popularity of the book, has become synonymous with the absurd. The 
close association between Beckett’s work (despite Beckett’s objections to such labelling) with 
the absurd has since become a major area of scholarship in its own right, making any 
discussion within this study insignificant by comparison.30 Avoiding this book sustains a more 
direct line of enquiry distinct from the complexities of the discourse around absurdist theatre, 
and also prevents a discussion of the topic that is both too general and too brief. The omission 
of Essin’s work is not intended to devalue it; rather, to discuss it thoroughly would require a 
large detour. His text is an important contribution to the study of the absurd and the wider 
understanding of Camus’s thought and deserves credit. 
Among the texts that seem to follow on from Esslin’s, The Absurd (1969) by Arnold 
Hinchliffe is particularly worthy of recognition. Hinchliffe acknowledges his debt to Esslin 
early in the book, and states his aim to situate the concept in a more broad literary and 
philosophical tradition.31 While Hinchliffe’s book achieves this in several ways, first by the 
discussion of the antecedents of absurdist literature, and then the work of Sartre, Camus, and 
																																																						
29 Martin Esslin, The Theatre of the Absurd (New York: Vintage Books, 2001), 15. 
30 Ibid., 14; Charles Juliet, Conversations with Samuel Beckett and Bram Van Velde, trans. Janey 
Tucker (Leiden: Academic Press Leiden, 1995), 148-49. 
31 Arnold Hinchliffe, The Absurd (London: Methuen, 1969), 2. 
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the theatre of the absurd, he does not mention Kierkegaard at all. This omission is partly to do 
with the prohibitive brevity of the book, which he acknowledges, as well as his stated aim to 
only discuss the idea of the absurd in the context of the ‘death of god’—perhaps precluding 
Kierkegaard due to the abundance of Christian themes in his work.32 It would be 
presumptuous to infer that Hinchliffe was not aware of the sceptical nature of Kierkegaard’s 
argument with Christian faith, as well as his instrumental role in twentieth-century 
existentialism. It is more likely that Hinchliffe’s book was not long enough to discuss 
Kierkegaard’s complicated work thoroughly, and that, as he states in the introduction, the 
volume largely makes the case for the theatre of the absurd since it is in these works that he 
believes absurdity to be best expressed.33 Therefore, because Hinchliffe neglects Kierkegaard’s 
influence, and because his discussion of the absurd seems to function best as a supplementary 
volume to Esslin’s, it is largely omitted from the present study. 
Thomas Nagel conducts an independent and thorough analysis of the absurd in his 
1971 essay, The Absurd, and while it is a significant discussion of the concept it will not be 
addressed in the present study. This has to do with the essay’s central argument. Nagel is 
critical of the use of the term to describe feelings of insignificance and futility, but finds the 
concept useful to describe a contradictory, yet intrinsic, aspect of human thought. His essay 
begins by analysing the simple reasons why one might consider his or her life to be absurd: 
that human life is short and becomes insignificant with the passing of time, that humans are 
small and mortal compared with the scale of the infinite cosmos, and that occupying ourselves 
with stressful careers and complicated relationships does not change the fact that we will 
eventually die, negating our efforts and achievements.34 Nagel explains that these are 
inadequate reasons to consider life as absurd, because if they were reversed they would not 
make life any more or less absurd. For example, of course our lives will not matter in a million 
years, because the life of someone in a million years’ time does not matter to us, and if life is 
absurd while it is short and we are small, then it would be just as absurd if it were infinitely 
long and we were infinitely huge.35 In other words, these arguments are circular, they do not 
explain that life is absurd, only that the person who uses them has already assumed it to be the 
case. While Nagel’s argument is quite valid it is of little use to the present study because it has a 
different aim. His aim is to refute the more vernacular causes of the feeling of absurdity, which 
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33 Ibid. 
34 Thomas Nagel, ‘The Absurd,’ The Journal of Philosophy 68, no. 20 (1971): 716-17. 
35 Ibid., 717. 
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he achieves, but his essay neither contributes to the understanding of the concept in its original 
discussion, nor aids in its comparison with more recent examples.  
Despite his initial, rather dismissive, appraisal of the absurd Nagel later elaborates on 
its utility to describe a distinctive human psychological tendency, but again he does so in a 
manner that deviates from the intentions of the present study. He states that absurd situations 
arise when one’s pretension or aspirations contradict, or are not realistic in, the circumstances 
in which they find themselves. Normally we are able to dismiss the occurrence, adjust our 
aspirations accordingly, or extricate ourselves from the situation, but when we notice this 
discrepancy in our fundamental attitude toward life then the problem becomes much more 
difficult.36 Nagel submits that the difficulty of this sense of absurdity is due to the fact that our 
intelligence is able to undermine itself, namely that we are always capable of doubt.37 In his 
view, the concept of the absurd is the clash between the seriousness with which we take our 
lives, and our capacity to doubt everything that we take seriously.38 He goes on to analyse the 
psychological causes and philosophical ramifications of this idea of the absurd in the remainder 
of the essay, but as seductive as his account may be, this is the point at which it deviates in 
principle from the present one. Nagel’s aim is to understand how it is possible to experience 
our lives as absurd, and to understand this as a peculiarity of human thought, however it is the 
aim of the present study to examine its evolution. Nagel’s essay is different to this study 
because it seeks to understand the concept of the absurd in another light, not to see how this 
concept is manifest in, and helps illuminate, other circumstances. 
Another philosopher and author who has used the term absurd is Jean-Paul Sartre, a 
central figure of existentialism who found inspiration in Kierkegaard’s work, and was an 
erstwhile friend of Camus.39 Despite these associations Sartre is not discussed at length in the 
present study, and this has to do with the meaning of the absurd in his work. The absurd for 
Sartre is the relationship between knowledge, perception and nature. Best played out in his 
novel Nausea (1938), it involves the sudden apprehension that our experience of the world is 
																																																						
36 Ibid., 718. 
37 Ibid., 719. 
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(Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 2004), 1-2; Jonathan Judaken, 
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13 
 
largely dictated by our practical understanding of it. When these ideas are removed and objects 
are perceived in their simple materiality they seem absurd, foreign to one’s understanding.40 
Sartre’s idea of the absurd is quite similar to Kierkegaard’s and Camus’s because it emphasises 
a disjuncture between human beings and the physical universe, and that this becomes clear 
with prolonged thought. However, Sartre’s absurd differs because it does not involve the 
rather crucial paradox that Kierkegaard’s and Camus’s does. Sartre’s absurd articulates the 
tenuous relationship between thought and experience, and while this is similar to Camus’s idea 
that the mind cannot comprehend meaning in the material world, it does not involve the same 
urgency and consequences. 
Apart from the resources outlined above, and despite the familiarity of the absurd as a 
philosophical concept, there are few discrete texts devoted to it. This could be due to its 
similarity with other concepts and artistic genres. Ideas of the futility of being can be 
recognised in Western culture since Greek tragedy, in philosophies of the tragic after 
Immanuel Kant, and even the works of William Shakespeare. Such works present the suffering 
of the individual due to circumstances of their own design, their insignificance before nature’s 
magnitude, and the tragic consequences of human foolishness. As Camus notes, Fyodor 
Dostoyevsky and Franz Kafka’s works feature heroes who question the meaning of life and 
suffer meaningless fates, but these do not belong to the same tradition because they reach 
different conclusions.41 The many ways that the absurd is anticipated in works of literature is 
more than enough to occupy a separate discussion, but it is not the purpose of this one. Rather 
than become immersed in these various anticipations and antecedents of the absurd in 
literature and philosophy, it is more efficient to observe it in works that use the term explicitly, 
and with specific regard to the question of meaning in life in the context of the loss of faith.  
Before the scholarship around the absurd is examined in more detail, it is obligatory to 
acknowledge that Kierkegaard was not the only philosopher to notice the effects of the decline 
of religion. For example, Arthur Schopenhauer’s philosophy entails the endless suffering of all 
forms of life as they compete for survival.42 Schopenhauer’s analysis differs to Kierkegaard’s 
because it begins with the assertion that any pursuit is futile, and concludes that the only way 
to appease suffering is to get rid of the will altogether. In effect, Kierkegaard works toward the 
absurd, where Schopenhauer works away from it—he begins at the end. Similarly, the 
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philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche announces the decline of religion in the West with the 
provocative words ‘God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him.’43 For Nietzsche, 
the decline of religion involves acknowledgement that god is no longer a source of justification 
for moral principles and a sense of life’s purpose, and could lead to a nihilistic abandonment of 
morality. While Nietzsche criticises the illusory nature of faith, and announces the 
psychological detriment involved in Christian notions of guilt and sin, he emphasises the need 
for a basis of morality in order to avoid nihilism. The work of Nietzsche and Schopenhauer are 
examples of how strongly philosophers reacted to the decreasing influence of the church, and 
show that Kierkegaard’s critique of Christianity is not isolated. 
Within the still-growing field of scholarship on Kierkegaard there are few books 
principally devoted to the themes already mentioned. The large quantity of texts that he self-
published, his idiosyncratic writing style, and the ambiguity of his precise attitude toward 
Christianity have led to a considerable variance in response. Somewhat ironically, although 
Kierkegaard’s techniques are intended to make his ideas clearer, they actually make his work 
more problematic to translate and to study, thus contributing to the at once voluminous and 
variant nature of Kierkegaard scholarship.44 Due to these inconsistencies it is necessary for the 
present study to consult different sources to outline different aspects of his work, and how the 
absurd is addressed within them, making an introductory commentary on each one both 
tedious and unnecessary. Yet despite the rather nebulous nature of Kierkegaard commentary, 
Michael Watts’ Kierkegaard (2003) is consistently cited to clarify each of his ideas. Published as a 
‘beginner’s guide’ it may seem out of place in this research, yet its insight into the exact nature 
of the absurd and Kierkegaard’s particular understanding of Christian faith is invaluable. Watts 
methodically sets out Kierkegaard’s core problem as the possibility of Christian faith, making 
explicit the idea that the absurd is a barrier against faith. Crucially, Watts emphasises that the 
absurd is a reaction to the assertions of Christian doctrine, and not the doctrines themselves, a 
detail that many other scholarly texts overlook. This detail is useful to demonstrate how the 
absurd is relevant to other contexts and not specific to Christianity. 
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 To continue the examination of the absurd in twentieth-century thought it is necessary 
to follow the trajectory taken by Esslin and Hinchliffe, and consult the work of Albert Camus. 
However, despite the fact that Camus’s ideas are well-known, scholarship that comments 
directly on his concept of the absurd is not abundant. Many texts about Camus take a much 
more biographical approach, and while many note his personal philosophy they rarely venture 
into its details. Nevertheless, the present study makes use of various adequate resources from 
this field, but owes much to Avi Sagi’s Albert Camus and the Philosophy of the Absurd (2002), which 
presents a thorough philosophical discussion of Camus’s oeuvre. It is the only sustained 
volume on the absurd in Camus’s work available at the time of writing, and as a result is 
invaluable. One of the main benefits of the text is how Sagi emphasises the functional nature 
of the absurd, specifically how Camus uses the term. Where many authors assume that the 
absurd means simply that life is meaningless, and that human activity is therefore futile and 
absurd, Sagi emphasises that it explicitly refers to the contradiction between the desire for life’s 
meaning and reason—or the conflict between one’s agency and one’s inherent inability to 
achieve their aim. Sagi’s definition of the absurd allows for Camus’s ideas to be clearly aligned 
with Kierkegaard’s, and makes it possible to discuss the concept in further contexts.  
Although Michel Houellebecq’s work is the most suitable for this discussion, it is 
important to note that other postmodern and contemporary authors operate in similar terrain. 
Houellebecq writes about contemporary life with such extreme pessimism that it divides 
audiences quite rigidly, much like Bret Easton Ellis, who polarised his readers with a notorious 
depiction of postmodern society that in many ways resembled Greek tragedy. Ellis dramatised 
the emptiness underpinning 1980s materialistic yuppie culture and its extreme psychological 
and moral consequences in American Psycho (1991), and similarly Houellebecq exacerbates 
contemporary self-sufficiency and self-help to the point of existential crisis. However, despite 
these similarities the two authors have significant differences, the clearest of which is 
chronological since Ellis’s work is more relevant to the 1980s. Another more recent example 
of relevant literature is David Foster Wallace’s lengthy work Infinite Jest (1996). Wallace has 
sympathy for the spiritual vacuity of everyday life, and the measures that ordinary people take 
to fill it. His characters are isolated, but his work conveys this as more of an innate aspect of 
individual life and less due to social and ideological influences. The preoccupations and 
addictions of his characters are also treated with a great deal more sympathy than 
Houellebecq’s, making it seem much more personal, and somewhat more guarded. While the 
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book is an exemplary work on the contemporary condition its objectives are less clear cut than 
Houellebecq’s and therefore less suitable for analysis.  
While the field of scholarship on Houellebecq’s work is growing, there are natural 
hazards that attend any authoritative discussion of a living author’s work, as there is always the 
potential that new work will contradict any conclusions reached. As a result, not many 
commentators have attempted to understand the core motivation of Houellebecq’s excoriation 
of contemporary society, and instead choose to focus on particular aspects of his work and 
what these might mean. For example, in The new pornographies: Explicit sex in recent French fiction 
and film (2007), Victoria Best and Martin Crowley examine the role of pornographic imagery in 
Houellebecq’s work, and how it amounts to an equivalence between individuals and 
commodities in late capitalism. Best and Crowley make a strong argument, and its highly 
specific nature is useful to define Houellebecq’s social critique within specific examples. Other 
texts attempt to reach more general conclusions about the author’s work, but lack a suitable 
lens to make their reflections more specific, and therefore more credible. Ben Jeffrey’s Anti 
Matter: Michel Houellebecq and Depressive Realism (2011) aims to summarise Houellebecq’s output 
in a thematically coherent and digestible manner. However, the scope of the book seems to 
outgrow its means, and its brevity and lack of scholarly citation reduces its value to this 
discussion. Similarly, John McCann’s Michel Houellebecq: Author of Our Times (2010) seems to be 
a personal reflection of Houellebecq’s work rather than rigorous literary criticism. It is a good 
meditation but it lacks the necessary objectivity to contribute to a scholarly account. 
Two thorough scholarly texts on Houellebecq’s work are Carole Sweeney’s Michel 
Houellebecq and the Literature of Despair and Douglas Morrey’s Michel Houellebecq: Humanity and its 
Aftermath (both 2013). Both of these texts provide extensive overviews of Houellebecq’s 
output prior to their publication, and both argue distinct theses that are helpful to the present 
study. Sweeney’s text asserts that all of Houellebecq’s writing depicts the market as the 
dominant force in contemporary life. The despair of the contemporary individual is caused by 
their alienation, which in turn is caused by social liberalism and aggravated by late capitalism. 
For Sweeney, Houellebecq points to a seeming paradox in contemporary society—that 
increased freedoms inevitably lead to greater unhappiness. Douglas Morrey argues that 
Houellebecq’s work is a sustained contribution to a broader definition of posthumanism. He 
proposes that the author’s criticism of contemporary liberalism is essentially a rejection of 
humanist values. Like Sweeney, he observes that increased personal freedom leads to 
unhappiness, but instead of ascribing this to market forces he attributes it to the prevalence of 
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humanist values, such as reason and autonomy. This makes the book particularly valuable, 
because it places Houellebecq’s ideas within the same historical parameters as the absurd—that 
the decline of religion laid bare the reality that human beings desire more than is rationally 
available, particularly when it comes to a sense of meaning and purpose. Crucially he explains 
how Houellebecq does not provide any solution to these problems, suggesting that they are 
innate to contemporary life, and that they are overwhelming and unavoidable. 
One problem with the study of the absurd and visual art is that the term can be so 
easily mistaken. For this reason, it is crucial that a clear distinction is made between art about 
the absurd, and absurd art, from the outset. The latter is quite simply art that is ridiculous, 
meaningless, and pointless in its own right—so thoroughly lacking sufficient aesthetic, 
conceptual, or critical content that it does not warrant the classification of art. For example, 
this could be work that is so inherently and unreflectively superficial that it would be more 
accurately described as a blithe decoration or novelty. It would be useless to give examples of 
such artworks, because they are self-evident. On the other hand, art about the absurd can take 
many forms, whether this is the performance of repetitive and futile tasks, works that present 
subjects as alienated and insignificant, or artists that celebrate the limitation of reason and logic 
by making works that deliberately flaunt convention and meaning. Such works present 
philosophical attitudes in creative forms, whether absurdity is depicted, insinuated, or defied—
if it is meaningless it questions the possibility of meaning, and if it is nonsensical it casts doubt 
on the sensible.  
There are many artists whose work may be considered according to the parameters 
described, therefore in the interest of concision and focus a more systematic approach is 
required to identify them. As such, the absurd in the contemporary moment can be defined in 
relation to four different artistic approaches. The first might be termed the ‘bodily absurd’, and 
applies to the work of artists such as Vito Acconci, with his relentless exploration of the limits 
of his own identity and materiality, and the failures that come to define them. The work of 
Marina Abramović, particularly her collaboration with Ulay, is also relevant to the bodily 
absurd, because together they consistently aimed to surpass the boundaries of their 
existence—their bodily endurance, identity, emotional attachment, and even their ontic 
materiality as evident in their later works. Another classification could be made under the title, 
the ‘commercial absurd’, and applied to the work of artists such as Andy Warhol or Jeff 
Koons. Both artists have made works, and assumed roles (particularly in the case of Warhol 
and his artistic persona), that create a kind of self-aggrandising, self-negating loop. Their works 
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comment on the superficial and commercial world by embodying the superficial and 
commercial—a pointless, Sisyphean activity both achieving and signifying nothing. Other 
artists make work that corresponds to what might be described as the ‘personal absurd’, which 
emphasise emotional and psychological frailty set against personal or social standards of 
confidence, efficacy, and merit. One might consider the work of Ugo Rondinone or Bas Jan 
Ader in this instance, as they separately portray human life as unheroic, laughable, and tragic. 
The fourth approach, the ‘political absurd’, is similar to the first in that it is characterised by 
the struggle against limitation, but rather than physical, this limitation is social and political, 
whether this is based on issues of gender, race, or social caste. While examples of politically-
resistant art are abundant, the work of Francis Alÿs is exemplary, since he regularly depicts 
Sisyphean struggles against certain and unfavourable odds. For example, in the performance 
entitled Paradox of Praxis 1 (Sometimes Making Something Leads to Nothing) (1997) Alÿs pushed a 
block of ice through the streets of Mexico City until it melted completely, his action 
symbolising the failure of repeated attempts to impose a Northern model of modernity on 
Latin America.45  
While the above artists warrant inclusion within this analysis, their work will not be 
discussed. This is due to the fact that, while they exemplify certain approaches to the absurd, 
Bruce Nauman’s work not only straddles several, but it is also the best example of an artistic 
approach that engages the absurd in a more existential or ontological sense. It is Nauman’s 
attitude towards making art, his process in making it, and also the works themselves that 
exemplify the absurd.  
Active for over half a century, the length and scope of Nauman’s career has led to a 
wide variety of critical responses. Therefore, it is necessary to focus on the artist’s pivotal role 
in the development of video and performance art, and the texts that specifically address it, in 
order to take a decisive line of enquiry that also relates to the studio work. Crucial among these 
is Bruce Nauman (2001), edited by Robert Morgan. This volume is a compilation of critical 
essays, catalogue texts, and book chapters that address Nauman’s performance art. Morgan’s 
introductory survey is particularly valuable due to several comments on the absurd in 
Nauman’s work, however, as is typical of surveys, Morgan’s discussion of Nauman’s art is 
quite general. Occasionally he mentions how works are reminiscent of the absurd without 
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going into detail to explain why. Robert Storr’s contribution to the text largely avoids the use 
the word absurd, instead he discusses Nauman’s themes of philosophical doubt and human 
limitation. His essay, Flashing a light in the Shadow of Doubt, is a general discussion of Nauman’s 
work that accompanied one of his retrospectives. This format suits Storr’s assertive style of 
writing, which favours long passages of reflection on the works’ broader significance. Because 
Storr prefers to discuss more universal themes the text is useful in order to illustrate the 
philosophical nature of Nauman’s work.  
Ingrid Schaffner’s essay Circling Oblivion: Bruce Nauman Through Samuel Beckett is also 
published in Morgan’s volume, and is particularly valuable due to its specific topic. As the title 
suggests, Schaffner follows Nauman’s affinity with Beckett’s writing by locating the writer’s 
influence in his artworks. This text is the single most sustained interpretation of Nauman’s 
work with respect to absurdist themes. Although it relies heavily on works of theatre, it 
emphasises the presence of frustration, repetition, and pointlessness in Nauman’s work. 
Significantly, her text does not fundamentally align Nauman’s worldview with Beckett’s but 
rather compares the work of the two formally and conceptually in order to determine their 
affinity. Thus, as she demonstrates, Nauman’s work reflects the absurd without a specific 
philosophical agenda, but rather out of an interest with its symbolism.  
Other texts of significant value are Please Pay Attention Please: Bruce Nauman’s Words 
(2005), edited by Janet Kraynak, and Bruce Nauman (2014) by Peter Plagens, both addressing 
the personal motivations of the artist. Plagens’ recent monograph Bruce Nauman is a thorough 
account of the artist’s work to date, and describes the manner in which Nauman’s particular 
approach to making art is reflected in each of his works. He emphasises the artist’s distinction 
from other movements and ideas, and the independence that such a position affords. By 
Plagens’ account, Nauman’s art is a solitary endeavour that is not reliant on the ideas and 
actions of others, and as a result it is possible to describe Nauman’s attitude as absurdist. Please 
Pay Attention Please features an interview between Nauman and Joan Simon where he reveals 
that frustration at human nature is foundational to his work. This is important for the present 
study because it means that while Nauman’s art reflects absurdist themes, it originates from 
more immediate concerns than the meaning of life.  
*** 
The present study is divided into four chapters beginning with an outline of Søren 
Kierkegaard’s theory of the absurd in relation to Christianity. It commences with a discussion 
of his concept of subjective truth, since this is how he proposes true faith is possible. 
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Subjective truth essentially involves an abandonment of logic, and thus it is useful to explain 
how the absurd is the product of rational thought and not faith. Kierkegaard uses the term 
absurd from various points of view, and in relation to different aspects of doctrine, to explain 
the true nature of faith—therefore it is necessary to explain how the absurd is consistent 
through each of these examples. He does so by postulating various exemplary figures that are 
capable of transcending the absurd, but frequently emphasises the personal sacrifice that the 
achievement of such a status involves, as well as its extreme difficulty. The chapter concludes 
with a discussion of Kierkegaard’s notion of the spheres of existence, a helpful analogy to 
understand how the absurd is a sort of barrier between rational thought and religious faith. 
While Kierkegaard’s authorship is devoted to the explanation of the possibility of such a faith, 
it frequently presents it as logically, and humanly, impossible. 
Chapter two examines the absurd in the philosophy and literature of Albert Camus. It 
begins with his definition of the concept in The Myth of Sisyphus (1942), and how it relates to the 
specific socio-historic conditions of his day. Particular attention is given to the fact that Camus 
uses the term as an atheist, and his conclusion that the absurd infers the total meaninglessness 
of life. The Rebel (1951) is then discussed in order to address his absurdist philosophy in more 
detail—particularly how he proposes one should react to the realisation that life is absurd. 
Camus’s ideas are then examined within his novel The Plague (1947), which presents his 
humanist absurdist philosophy in the form of a fictional narrative, thus providing a useful 
segue to Houellebecq’s work. 
Chapter three argues that Michel Houellebecq’s novels present a crisis in contemporary 
life that can be closely compared with the absurd, and these similarities are broken down under 
four subheadings. The first deals with Houellebecq’s criticism of Enlightenment humanism, 
and its role in the decline of religion. This decline leads to what Houellebecq describes as the 
rise of individualism in the sexual revolution and other liberation movements, and is examined 
second. The third section discusses how these factors contribute to his perception that most 
people are extremely unhappy, particularly with regard to relationships and ageing. The chapter 
concludes with Houellebecq’s predictions of the eventual decline of individualism in genetic 
engineering, or a return to religion. These conclusions clarify Houellebecq’s doubts that a 
sense of meaning can be found in life without sacrificing individuality and free thought. 
Chapter four condenses the many ways that Bruce Nauman’s work presents similar 
ideas to the absurd under six subheadings. The first likens Nauman’s idea of art practice to the 
existential problems of the absurd, particularly his reduction of the artistic act to his solitary 
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activity in the studio. The second examines an early series of performance videos that depict 
pointless and repetitive tasks, and these are compared with similar actions in the plays of 
Samuel Beckett. Nauman’s use of repetition is analysed in the third section, particularly the 
way that this emphasises a sense of entrapment and futility. The fourth section explains how 
Nauman replicates the absurd by making deliberately unintelligible artworks, and how the 
apparent meaninglessness of his work is distinct from nihilism. The fifth section briefly 
examines Nauman’s obscurity of his identity in his performances, and how this enhances and 
universalises his philosophical commentary. Finally, this commentary is analysed with reference 
to Nauman’s comments about his frustration with human nature, and how this manifests in his 
work in a way that makes it seem absurdist. The chapter is also interspersed with reflections on 
the accompanying artwork in the manner of Paul Valéry’s Introduction to the Method of Leonardo da 
Vinci (1894), and Julia Kristeva’s Stabat Mater (1977). These digressions are necessary in order 
to avoid the inelegancies of writing in the first person, while maintaining the critical tone of the 
chapter. This structure also helps to establish affinities between Nauman’s practice and the 
studio work, thereby placing it in the context of the present study. 
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Chapter One: Søren Kierkegaard 
 
Perhaps what led Søren Kierkegaard to describe belief as absurd had to do with his 
personal life, which permeates his work.46 Almost every account of Kierkegaard’s philosophy 
takes into consideration his aborted engagement with Regine Olsen, whom he had pursued for 
some time but left out of the fear that he could not fully devote himself to his marriage and his 
work at the same time.47 This sense of hesitancy and personal insufficiency manifests in several 
ways. For example, Kierkegaard’s texts are often written with the voices and opinions of other 
people, a technique he called ‘indirect communication’, and despite being a lifelong Christian 
he spent his career proving the extreme difficulty of belief in god. But this characteristic is 
most evident in his concept of the absurd, which represents internal division and the inability 
to commit in the extreme. Perhaps this is why his solution to faith involves the most singular 
commitment, taking as the only truth the unmeasurable inward experience of one’s being in 
order to embrace the irrational in faith. The absurd is what prevents this from happening; it is 
the product of thinking rationally about Christianity. In short, it is the point when one realises 
that faith is impossible. This chapter examines Kierkegaard’s ideas regarding faith, reason, and 
subjectivity in order to explain the absurd and its crucial position within them.  
 Kierkegaard’s work emphasises the paramount importance of a subjective rather than 
objective analysis of existence.48 For Kierkegaard, the peril of an objective study of existence is 
its ignorance of individuality.49 Objectivity is concerned with the perception and expression of 
outward facts, as a mode of understanding it is detached and observational. To view and 
describe something existing with objectivity is to ignore the inner experience of that existence. 
The inner experience of life itself is completely invisible to the observer, as it has no tangible 
quality despite the physical presence of the existing individual. If the moment-to-moment, 
inner experience of our lives has no measurable qualities then it cannot be understood 
objectively.50 Kierkegaard argued that the crisis of modern Christian thought was the ‘illusion 
																																																						
46 Tess Lewis, ‘Søren Kierkegaard: A Master of Refraction,’ The Hudson Review 59, no. 1 (2006): 
77. 
47 Michael Watts, Kierkegaard (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2003), 35-36. 
48 George Pattison, The Philosophy of Kierkegaard (Chesham: Acumen, 2005), 23. 
49 Watts, Kierkegaard, 80. 
50 Michael Weston, ‘Kierkegaard, Levinas, and “Absolute Alterity”,’ in Kierkegaard and Levinas:  
Ethics, Politics, and Religion, ed. David Wood J. Aaron Simmons (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2008), 162. 
23 
 
of objectivity’.51 For Kierkegaard, the essence of any truth lies in the individual’s understanding 
of it.52 This understanding is not outwardly measurable because it is within the individual—it is 
their conscious recognition of a fact, not the fact itself. If the truth lies in the individual’s 
recognition of it, then it has more to do with the unfolding process of existing. It is completely 
inward and therefore cannot be outwardly gauged for objective understanding. As he states: 
‘Subjectivity, inwardness, is truth… the inwardness of the existing person is the truth.’53 
Kierkegaard’s idea of subjective truth is the personal recognition of one’s own self currently 
existing. It is a continual process of actively acknowledging the passage of existence, and the 
self that is the vehicle for this existence.54 In short, it could be described as the inward 
recognition of one’s own existence unfolding within temporal reality. Kierkegaard refers to 
subjective truth as the highest truth for a human to acknowledge.55 Other forms of truth are 
objective because they relate to the facts of being; subjective truth is the process of being. 
 Subjective truth forms the most elementary paradox that occupies Kierkegaard’s 
thought. The perception of this paradox leads to what he calls objective uncertainty. Because 
the source of subjective truth is within the existing individual, he or she cannot perceive it 
from an external standpoint. If subjective truth cannot be experienced objectively, then it 
cannot be understood rationally. Furthermore, because subjective truth is a continual 
engagement with the constantly unravelling process of existing, it can never be comprehended 
as a finished, logical truth.56 Therefore, because subjective experience is impossible for an 
objective view to simultaneously analyse, it is a logical paradox. Subjective truth is the most 
essential factor of our status as living beings and, according to Kierkegaard, is irrefutable as 
truth. Indeed this truth is the only definitive truth to our existence because it is our existence. 
Objectivity cannot be relied upon to deal with matters of subjective existence, because of the 
paradox. Therefore it must follow that subjective truth is superior. This is how Kierkegaard 
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manages to assert subjectivity’s status as the highest form of truth.57 As he states: ‘When 
subjectivity, inwardness, is truth, then truth, objectively defined, is a paradox; and that truth is 
objectively a paradox shows precisely that subjectivity is truth.’58 Kierkegaard’s view that 
subjective truth undermines objective certainty is bolstered by the fact that objectivity is 
influenced by subjective truth. Subjective truth is entirely within the existing self and it is the 
existing self that perceives the objective truth. In other words, our impressions of the external 
world are influenced by our core values.59 In this manner Kierkegaard arrives at what he calls 
objective uncertainty. The fact that an objective view of the subjective truth is paradoxical, and 
the assertion of subjective truth is the only given fact of our existence, leads to a conclusion of 
the uncertainty of an objective viewpoint regarding existence. With objectivity debunked as 
such, Kierkegaard claims that the individual is able to embrace values that are objectively or 
logically uncertain, such as Christian faith.  
 Like subjective truth, Christianity is objectively paradoxical. For Kierkegaard, Christian 
faith presents the highest form of subjective truth attainable.60 When fully embraced as an 
existential condition, Kierkegaard’s Christianity involves a passionate, ongoing inner 
commitment with the infinite God. Like the moment-to-moment unfolding of the existential 
self, the Christian God is an eternal, intangible truth that is objectively uncertain.61 The 
engagement with God cannot be made objectively. This engagement must be an entirely 
subjective, inner passion.62 Regarding this kind of subjectivity, Kierkegaard states: ‘An 
objective uncertainty, held fast through appropriation with the most passionate inwardness, is 
the truth, the highest truth there is for an existing person.’63 Relating this to Christianity, 
Kierkegaard asserts that:  
 
The definition of truth stated above is a paraphrasing of faith… Faith is the 
contradiction between the infinite passion of inwardness and the objective uncertainty. 
If I am able to apprehend God objectively, I do not have faith; but because I cannot 
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do this, I must have faith. If I want to keep myself in faith, I must continually see to it 
that I hold fast the objective uncertainty.64 
 
Faith and subjective truth are inherently similar because they are both inner passions and 
objectively uncertain. Naturally, this faith requires a subjective acceptance—it cannot be 
communicated directly. Like subjective truth, faith cannot be grasped intellectually. For 
Kierkegaard, ‘the subjective acceptance is precisely the decisive factor; and an objective 
acceptance of Christianity is paganism or thoughtlessness.’65 Objectively comprehending and 
believing the irrational propositions of Christianity is not Kierkegaard’s idea of faith. Rather, 
this is more of a mindless, gullible acceptance of a nonsensical statement. According to 
Kierkegaard, internalising God as a subjective passion removes God’s irrationality, because 
rationality is an objective concern.66 In other words, because of the logical inconceivability of 
our unfolding existence, we exist, and because of the objective irrationality of an infinite, 
transcendent absolute, God exists. ‘It is subjectivity that Christianity is concerned with, and it 
is only in subjectivity that the truth exists, if it exists at all; objectively, Christianity has 
absolutely no existence.’67 As such, faith makes it possible for the individual to engage with 
God in a state of being uninhibited by the constraints of logical thought. Kierkegaard 
considered this notion of a life of subjective faith the paramount level of selfhood that can be 
achieved by a human being.68 It is only in this way that one can transcend the irrationality of 
Christianity and live with passionate subjective faith.  
 Both subjective truth and faith are objective uncertainties and as such can be 
considered paradoxical. Kierkegaard asserts that Christian faith contains another paradox, what 
he calls the ‘absolute paradox’—the central assertion of Christianity that God was incarnated 
in the human form of Christ. Kierkegaard’s problem with this assertion has to do with the 
dynamics of the incarnation. God is infinite, immortal, eternal and transcendental from all 
temporal forms of existence. Humans are finite, temporal and, above all, mortal. To suggest 
that an infinite transcendental phenomenon somehow, without rational explanation, managed 
to manifest in the temporal realm in the form of a mortal human being is entirely 
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preposterous. As Kierkegaard states, ‘that that which in accordance with its nature is eternal 
comes into existence in time, is born, grows up, and dies—this is a breach with all thinking.’69 
Any application of logic to resolve this paradox is bound to fail, it is intellectually impossible to 
explain objectively. It is a wildly irrational proposition, but it is a proposition that the individual 
must face in order to become Christian.70 It is possible for the imagination to apprehend such 
a paradox occurring, because with imagination all things are possible. But to comprehend that 
this actually happened in the history of this planet is impossible: ‘In the fantasy-medium of 
possibility God can perfectly well for the imagination be fused with a man, but that this should 
occur in reality with an individual man, this precisely is the paradox.’71 The fact that this 
paradox, the ‘absolute paradox’, is impossible to comprehend dictates that any rational attempt 
to adopt this central belief results in failure. The absolute paradox is offensive to reason, and is 
therefore absurd. As Kierkegaard states:  
 
What, then, is the absurd? The absurd is that the eternal truth has come into existence 
in time, that God has come into existence, has been born, has grown up, etc., has come 
into existence exactly as an individual human being, indistinguishable from any other 
human being…72 
 
This is not to say that the absolute paradox is in itself the absurd. The absurd is the reasoning 
mind’s inability to grasp the paradox objectively. The absolute paradox presents the absurd. 
Because the individual cannot rationally digest the paradox, the reasoning faculties of the mind 
reject it. In this attempted transaction of logic, the absurd is the ‘rebound’—the mind’s 
withdrawal from the assertion of the paradox, a reaction of offense.73 As Kierkegaard puts it, 
the absurd is the ‘negative criterion’, the dismissal of a necessary criterion for faith: ‘The 
absurd is the negative criterion of that which is higher than human understanding and 
knowledge.’74 Because of the mind’s refusal to positively absorb the absolute paradox as a fact, 
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this refusal is a negative response.75 It is the mind’s assertion that it cannot be correct, a 
negative judgement or disagreement with an illogical proposition: ‘The activity of reason is to 
distinguish the paradox negatively—but no more.’76 The incarnation presents an impossible 
situation, a suggested historical fact that does not marry with the usual information that the 
rational mind can process. There is no scientific evidence to explain this impossible situation. 
The absurd, the response to the impossible situation, relies on this lack of evidence. ‘The 
absurd is the negative determinant which assures, for example, that I have not overlooked one 
or another possibility which still lies within the human arena.’77 Kierkegaard’s definition of the 
absurd is as simple as the definition of the word itself. It is the mind’s reaction of offense to an 
illogical suggestion. What separates his absurd from the usual definition is its context. While 
typical instances of absurdity are often arbitrary or illogical, Kierkegaard’s absurd presents itself 
on the crux of what he perceived to be the most important process of thought that a human 
can embark upon. This process is of course the path to faith, in his terms, ‘becoming 
Christian’. As such, the absurd is the last obstacle that one must encounter, an obstacle that 
stands on the threshold to a life of passionate subjective faith.  
Just as the absurd relies on a lack of evidence for the absolute paradox, it also relies on 
faith. In the driest terms, if there is no suggestion of a paradox there cannot be an offense of 
reason. Similarly, if reason is not offended, there cannot be an absurd. For the absurd to exist, 
faith must remain a possibility. As Kierkegaard asserts, faith cannot be taken for granted, it 
must be earned through the pursuit of subjective truth. This faith, which Kierkegaard terms 
‘existential faith’, is an entirely personal pursuit. As such, one cannot blindly accept Christian 
doctrine as the truth; first one must face the absurd. As Kierkegaard states, ‘in order to become 
a believer everyone must be alone with the absurd.’78 In becoming Christian, one must face the 
absurdity of Christianity’s assertions even though they exist in, and can only comprehend 
objectively, the finite world where such things are impossible. In order to overcome the 
rational revulsion of the absolute paradox, one must acknowledge their limitations. Like the 
mind’s inability to perceive the totality of infinity, we as humans cannot comprehend God’s 
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eternal transcendental nature, or the absolute paradox.79 If we continue to perceive the nature 
of existence objectively, the paradox is rejected by the mind. However, if we can acknowledge 
our mind’s limitations in objectively comprehending such things, it becomes possible to 
perform what Kierkegaard calls the ‘leap to faith’.80 Because objective uncertainty undermines 
logic, faith becomes an option. In other words, with the prior realisation of objective 
uncertainty we can come to terms with the incapacity of our minds to deal with matters of 
experiential existence. This allows us to move beyond the absurd rejection of the absolute 
paradox in a leap of faith.  
For any leap of faith to take place the individual must have faith as their object. 
Presumably at this point the believer-to-be is well aware of Christian doctrine, otherwise the 
absolute paradox would not be absurd. The individual would be completely ignorant of it. 
Because he or she is seeking faith, has found subjective truth, and is obviously sincerely 
committed to self-realisation, he or she is almost already there. For Kierkegaard, this faith is 
‘the inner transformation of the whole mind, by which a person in life-peril of the spirit comes 
in earnest, in true inwardness, to believe at least something—of the considerable Christianity 
that he knows.’81 This pursuit of true inwardness must end with faith. Kierkegaard asserts that 
the individual, through subjectivity, generates his or her own faith. Rather than arriving at faith, 
he or she creates it: 
 
Truly, no more than God allows a species of fish to come into existence in a particular 
lake unless the plant that is its nourishment is also growing there, no more will God 
allow the truly concerned person to be ignorant of what he is to believe. That is, the 
need brings its nourishment along with it; what is sought is in the seeking that seeks it; 
faith is in the concern over not having faith… The need brings the nourishment along 
with it, not by itself, as if the need produced the nourishment, but by virtue of a divine 
determination that joins the two, the need and the nourishment.82 
 
Speaking of the need and the nourishment in this way, Kierkegaard implies that becoming 
Christian is as important as the Christianity that one believes in. Faith is as important as its 
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object.83 The divine determination is God’s predestination that the two can become connected, 
which Kierkegaard believes is a wonder, or a miracle.84 The fact that a miracle is required for 
this connection makes Christian faith a paradox in itself: ‘But then is faith just as paradoxical as 
the paradox? Quite so. How else could it have its object in the paradox and be happy in its 
relation to it? Faith itself is a wonder, and everything that is true of the paradox is also true of 
faith.’85 Faith itself is a paradox guarded in a way by the absurd.86 If one is to have faith it must 
be on the strength of the unthinkable nature of paradox, and that faith is in itself paradoxical.  
Faith is ultimately irrational, and any believer must embrace that irrationality based on 
the objective uncertainty created by his or her own subjective experience. If an individual 
cannot embrace this irrationality, if faith is considered too irrational a goal to ever potentially 
be a goal, then faith is impossible, and the absurd is not the absurd. It is merely an untruth. For 
the absurd to be absurd it must be a proposition. When faith is ruled out the proposition is not 
proposed and no offence to reason can take place and the absurd becomes nonsense: 
 
The absurd, the paradox… is a symbol, a riddle, a compounded riddle about which 
reason must say: I cannot solve it, it cannot be understood, but it does not follow 
thereby that it is nonsense. But, of course, if faith is completely abolished, the whole 
sphere is dropped, and then reason conceited and perhaps concludes that, ergo, the 
paradox is nonsense.87 
 
For Kierkegaard the question of faith is paramount. True to his dialectical approach and his 
method of indirect communication this question is addressed from a variety of angles 
throughout his authorship. A key angle to this approach is evident in Fear and Trembling (1843). 
 The absurd in Fear and Trembling contextually differs to that which is caused by the 
absolute paradox, but is essentially similar. In the text Kierkegaard implements the Old 
Testament story of Abraham to discuss existential faith. According to the story, God promised 
Abraham a son through whom he would become father of a people. All that was required of 
Abraham in return was absolute faith in God. Abraham grew old remaining childless but never 
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gave up his faith. Eventually Isaac was born when both parents were clearly too old to 
conceive. Isaac grew to adulthood and thrived, at which time God told Abraham that it was his 
duty to sacrifice Isaac at the distant Mount Moriah. Abraham was left with a choice whether to 
keep Isaac and abandon his faith in God, who gave him Isaac, or sacrifice Isaac and keep his 
faith in God who promised and delivered him a son in the first place. Kierkegaard’s interest in 
the story lies in the paradoxes Abraham faced in this decision, and his ability to carry out the 
sacrifice. For Abraham to have faith, he must overcome the absurdity of God’s command. In 
this case, the paradox is the fact that God’s command entailed two contradictory suggestions. 
According to God’s initial promise, Isaac must live because through him Abraham was 
destined to become father of a people. But according to God’s latest command, Isaac was to 
be sacrificed, making the first promise redundant. The combination of these two assertions is 
paradoxical, and therefore offensive to reason. This is the absurd with which Abraham is 
confronted.88 For Abraham, ‘the collision is precisely between two higher hints—God’s 
promise about Isaac and God’s demand that he sacrifice Isaac’.89 In Fear and Trembling, 
Kierkegaard employs Abraham’s role as the prototype of Christian faith to once again express 
the subjective nature of existential faith. Because of the lack of the absolute paradox in 
Abraham’s time, the absurd appears as a paradoxical divine command, one that he must 
personally overcome.  
 
That there is a difference between the absurd in Fear and Trembling and the paradox in 
Concluding Unscientific Postscript is quite correct. The first is the purely personal definition 
of existential faith—the other is faith in relationship to a doctrine.90 
 
While there are literal differences between these two instances of the absurd, they are 
essentially similar. Both instances detail a final and rationally unacceptable obstacle before 
faith. With Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard’s pseudonym Johannes de Silentio manages to 
establish the absurd’s universality. Because the story of Abraham takes place before Christ, 
Kierkegaard needs to establish the absurd outside Christianity. In doing so, Kierkegaard 
outlines another instance of the subjective experience of faith:  
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The objection that there is conflict between the absurd in Johannes de Silentio and in 
Johannes Climacus is a misunderstanding. In the same way according to the New 
Testament Abraham is called the father of faith, and yet it is indeed clear that the 
content of his faith cannot be Christian—that Jesus Christ has been in existence. But 
Abraham’s faith is the formal definition of faith. So it is also with the absurd.91 
 
Because of Abraham’s prototypical faith, his collision with the absurd is no different from that 
of any contemporary Christian. The only difference is situational. Abraham’s absurd is a 
paradoxical divine command, likewise the Christian’s absurd is the paradoxical assertion of a 
doctrine. Both instances of the absurd are essentially identical. And both require the believer to 
have faith on the strength of its irrationality. 
 Commonly found in Kierkegaard’s authorship is the phrase ‘by virtue of the absurd’. 
For an individual to have faith they must believe in the strength of the absurd, as distinct from 
merely believing the absurd. Because it is completely irrational, the individual must suspend 
reason in order to overcome the absurd. In Concluding Unscientific Postscript (1846), Kierkegaard 
asserts that this can be done on the strength of the objective uncertainty. In Fear and Trembling, 
however, comparatively little is offered as to why Abraham performed the leap. Much is left to 
the assumption that a divine command carries with it some certainty of God’s existence, or 
even assistance.92 Instead, Kierkegaard highlights the sheer irrationality of his faith, completely 
devoid of human reasoning. Abraham did not want to sacrifice his son, but God demanded it. 
God had also promised earlier that Isaac would live and prosper, but now God wanted Isaac 
killed. God’s demand was absurd, and because God’s demand was absurd, Abraham was able 
to maintain the absurd belief that he would not, in the end, have to sacrifice Isaac:  
 
During all this time he had faith, he had faith that God would not demand Isaac of 
him, and yet he was willing to sacrifice him if it was demanded. He had faith by virtue 
of the absurd, for human calculation was out of the question, and it certainly was 
absurd that God, who required it of him, should in the next moment rescind the 
requirement.93 
 
																																																						
91 Ibid. 
92 Mooney, Knights of Faith and Resignation, 52. 
93 Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, trans. Howard Hong and Edna Hong (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1983), 35-6. 
32 
 
God did rescind the requirement at the last moment by offering a ram to be sacrificed while 
Abraham’s knife was drawn. Abraham’s faith was absurd, but it proved correct. Abraham had 
faith because logic had no power to dissolve his situation. He had faith because the proposed 
situation was illogical, and adopted an illogical faith to deal with it. Abraham believed in the 
impossible, sacrificing logic to sacrifice Isaac.94 The Christian has faith because of the absurdity 
of the incarnation. Similarly Abraham maintains his faith that Isaac will live because of the 
absurdity of God’s command.  
According to the Postscript, faith must be achieved because the absurd cannot be 
understood. Just as the absurd is a negative reaction to the paradox, faith is a negative reaction 
to the absurd. ‘It can be believed altogether-against the understanding. If anyone imagines that 
he understands it, he can be sure that he misunderstands it.’95 To accept the content of 
Christian faith blindly is to reduce the importance of the absurd. Moreover, blind acceptance 
would be a sign of immense stupidity because it is the operation of logic that makes the absurd 
absurd. If one can believe Christian assertions immediately, one can believe anything. Instead 
of faith, it is gullibility: ‘He who understands it plainly (in contrast to understanding that it 
cannot be understood) will confound Christianity with one or another pagan analogy 
(analogies that lead away from factual reality)’.96 This confounded Christianity is faith simply 
based on a lack of reason. Kierkegaard’s Christianity is faith against all reason. It is a full 
acknowledgement of impossibility that is used to strengthen the position of faith, because 
existence itself is objectively irrational.  
 The central focus of Fear and Trembling is what was involved in Abraham’s sacrifice of 
Isaac. For Kierkegaard, to be willing to sacrifice his only son required Abraham to completely 
resign from any emotional connection he had with Isaac. This resignation from his earthly 
commitments allowed Abraham direct communion with God, and God’s will. Among these 
earthly commitments was Isaac. According to Kierkegaard, Abraham’s resignation of the 
earthly allowed him to carry out the sacrifice devoid of any connection to Isaac. But at the 
same time Abraham needed to continue loving Isaac. For the time being Isaac remained his 
son, and it was a long ride to Mount Moriah. In short, Abraham needed to be totally 
committed as well as completely withdrawn from his son at the same time. This simultaneous 
position of absolute connection to God and earthly grounding is the ability of what 
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Kierkegaard calls a Knight of Faith.97 The renunciation of all earthly hopes, concerns and 
possessions is what Kierkegaard refers to as Infinite Resignation. This resignation allows the 
individual to embrace the infinite God without being tied down to the finite world. It is the 
disavowal of the petty concerns of human existence that allows the full acceptance of God’s 
infinite grace.98 According to Kierkegaard, Infinite Resignation is only half of the requirements 
of a Knight of Faith. The other is the simultaneous ability to ‘remain in finitude’. This requires 
the Knight to fully embrace the requirements of earthly existence. It is to continue living, and 
even enjoying finite existence in the full knowledge of its utter superfluity in the face of the 
infinite. While Abraham best exemplifies the gravity of this undertaking by continuing to love 
Isaac, Kierkegaard also describes the day-to-day existence of what could be called the everyday 
Knight of Faith:  
 
[The Knight] belongs altogether to the world, no petit bourgeois belongs to it more… 
This man takes pleasure, takes part, in everything, and whenever one catches him 
occupied with something his engagement has the persistence of the worldly person 
whose soul is wrapped up in such things… if one didn’t know him, it would be impossible 
to set him apart from the rest of the crowd.99 
  
The life of a Knight of Faith, while ideal for Kierkegaard, is utterly paradoxical. It involves two 
contradictory ‘movements’, one to the infinite as well as one to the temporal. Because of the 
completely subjective nature of these movements, and because of their contradictory nature, 
they must be made at every instant. The Knight of Faith’s life is a continual ‘dance-like double 
movement’ around the absurd.100 As such there is a recurring possibility that in the next instant 
the Knight’s movements may fail.101 At any instant the tendency for objectivity could take over 
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and reason may be offended: ‘When the believer has faith, the absurd is not the absurd—faith 
transforms it, but in every weak moment it is again more or less absurd to him.’102 Because the 
Knight of Faith is continually ‘dancing’, the absurd is always present as a possible reaction. 
Kierkegaard’s hero never truly escapes the absurd.  
 A popular mode of explaining Kierkegaard’s ideas of self-development is their 
simplification in the form of the three spheres of human existence. Due to his method of 
indirect communication these spheres, or stages, are elucidated in only some of his texts.103 
Other texts such as Fear and Trembling explore the same concepts but from the varied individual 
viewpoints of their pseudonymous authors. In order of progression these stages are the 
aesthetic, the ethical and the religious. Aesthetic existence, as the name suggests, is 
preoccupied with the sensuous properties of human existence. What can be touched, tasted or 
seen is inevitably rooted in the external, physical world. Kierkegaard asserts that an existence 
totally engaged in the experience of these properties is inherently shallow.104 These individuals 
are interested only in personal gratification, be this the day-to-day struggle for survival or the 
most opulent hedonism. This is not to say that the ‘aesthete’ is selfish, rather these individuals 
are entirely preoccupied with everyday tasks and concerns.  
Within the aesthetic stage there are various levels. The lowest is an almost animal-like 
pursuit of base pleasure, the relentless pursuit of immediate gratification. These immediate 
pleasures could take the form of drugs, alcohol or sex.105 Higher levels share the same 
preoccupations, but with an element of sophistication. These pleasures could be intellectual 
conversation, good company or the appreciation of fine art. These aesthetic individuals actively 
choose how best to enjoy life because they are highly selective in all forms of pleasure.106 
Kierkegaard outlines many other examples of aesthetic existence such as those whose sole 
interest is the preservation of health or beauty, or career-driven individuals who forever chase 
financial success.107 Regardless of the preoccupation, these modes of existence are all focused 
on the immediate aspects of this world. The focus is entirely on external qualities that have 
nothing to do with the inner self.108 At any moment these aspects can be taken away. As such, 
the aesthete’s happiness is at the whim of the universe: ‘Fortune, misfortune, fate, immediate 
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enthusiasm, despair—these are what the aesthetic life-view has at its disposal’.109 Because 
aesthetic individuals place all importance on the external and temporary aspects of life, they 
lack an awareness of the inner self. If, however, the individual perceives that this kind of 
existence is lacking it is then possible to move into the ethical sphere.  
A segue into the ethical can be achieved when one realises the meaninglessness of their 
aesthetic existence, living it with ironic detachment. This ironic view of existence acknowledges 
the futility of aesthetic endeavours, but continues with these endeavours with cynicism. From 
this point it is easier for the individual to move into the ethical sphere because they realise the 
arbitrary nature of aesthetic existence. The ethical individual is concerned in determining the 
inner self, shaping their view of existence with the help of morals and values. At this level, the 
individual takes responsibility for their past and future actions as they relate to themselves and 
the choices they have made, rather than ascribing them to luck, fate or other external 
influences. As such this individual is autonomous, able to choose his or her actions. Being able 
to choose liberates the individual from the continual cycle of desire-satisfaction now that they 
have a central moral ideal. Even though the ethical person’s actions do not necessarily 
conform to the demands of aesthetic existence, they are still informed by reason. In 
determining the correct action to be taken in a given circumstance, the ethical individual 
applies logic according to the moral absolute of his or her character.  
In later writings, Kierkegaard dissolves the ethical sphere into the religious because of 
the problematic nature of a purely ethical existence. For instance, the ethical individual would 
encounter many devastating moral dilemmas throughout the course of their life. These would 
be irreconcilable with their central ideals and lead to a state of dejection. It is not difficult to 
see why Kierkegaard merged these two spheres. Regarding Abraham, moral impulse had to be 
ignored to go through with the sacrifice, it was faith that informed his actions. This could 
easily be viewed as a transition from the ethical to the religious.110 There is always the 
supposition that if Abraham did not have faith there would be no dilemma. However, this is 
clearly not an option for Kierkegaard. Faith provides a solution to contradictory ethical 
dilemmas. When two ethical standpoints are both morally valid, but pose a threat to one 
another if carried out, one must be chosen. Faith allows this choice. Faith transcends logical 
paradoxes because faith itself is irrational, thus transcending logic. Both the aesthetic and the 
ethical spheres lie before the religious sphere. According to Kierkegaard, the absurd lies 
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precisely within this gap: ‘The absurd terminates negatively before the sphere of faith, which is 
a sphere by itself.’111 The paradoxes of the ethical approach and the futility of the aesthetic 
sphere prompt the move into the religious sphere. Here the individual encounters another 
paradox that the logic of the two previous spheres cannot maintain. Because it is paradox that 
is driving the individual towards faith, they must accept the absurdity of faith.  
Life is absurd, and faith is absurd. The absurd, the ‘negative’ reaction to the paradox of 
Christianity, ‘terminates’ before the religious sphere. The absurd is the threshold of faith. It is 
the last reason-offending hurdle that the individual must pass. Once passed, the absurd 
disappears. The illustrative aspect of the spheres also indicates the ‘balancing act’ of the Knight 
of Faith. For Kierkegaard, the spheres are not in complete isolation to one another. They are 
more like building blocks. If an individual has ascended into the next sphere, they still remain 
in contact with the previous. A person in the religious sphere still has earthly requirements like 
eating and working as well as ethical commitments. However, these are subordinate to the 
requirements of the religious sphere, the absolute commitment before God, which remains his 
or her highest priority.  
By illustrating the emptiness and pointlessness of temporal existence, Kierkegaard’s 
intention was to bolster the position of existential faith as the ultimate way of life. But when 
the possibility of faith is removed, the only conclusion that can be made from his ideas is the 
inherent meaninglessness of existence.112 The absurd stands at the threshold between faith and 
reason, as such it can only justify the ‘leap to faith’ or the sobering conclusion of nihilism.113 
Kierkegaard’s assertions of the subjectivity of faith also helped justify the atheistic view. 
Because faith cannot be objectively held, it must be subjectively lived.114 Such a suggestion 
carries its own uncertainties. Subjectively, anything can be believed. Or, as Albert Camus puts 
it: ‘Since nothing is proved, everything can be proved.’115 It was Kierkegaard’s upbringing and 
the socio-religious climate of his time that influenced his need to justify faith. He did so in the 
only rationally acceptable way, by explaining faith’s irrationality. He introduced the idea of the 
absurd as an acknowledgement of this irrationality. Furthermore, he admitted that the absurd is 
an ever-present possibility in the life of the faithful, an inescapable uncertainty to accompany 
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the irrationality of a life of faith.116 Even if faith is subjectivity and truth is subjectivity, an 
irrational leap is still required. There is nothing to stop the individual living a life of atheism 
with subjectivity.117 It is only convenient that atheism sits so comfortably in objectivity as well. 
For Kierkegaard, the process of subjective faith generates the individual’s perception of God, 
the object of their belief. By the same logic, the subjective experience of a person without faith 
also propagates their acceptance of the meaninglessness of existence.118 Kierkegaard’s ideas can 
operate both ways.  
Without faith as a paradigm, the work of Kierkegaard takes a very different shape. In 
unleashing the truth of existential dread he exposed the flippant way in which life is so often 
lived. Begging the question of the meaning of existence in this way, he gestured towards the 
intangible absolute of God’s grace. But in a life devoid of such grace this realisation is grim. 
The focus then becomes authenticity, a search for personal meaning.119 Camus took what he 
could from Kierkegaard’s ideas and applied them to his own condition.120 When faith is 
removed from Kierkegaard’s objectives, the outcomes of his process of self-definition are 
radically different. The dynamics, however, remain the same. Kierkegaard introduced Camus, 
among others, to the inescapable alienation of individual life, the meaning of despair and the 
finality of death. Above all he introduced Camus to the absurd, and along with it, the limits of 
reason.121 
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Chapter 2: Albert Camus 
 
Albert Camus’s concept of the absurd is fundamentally similar to Kierkegaard’s, but 
aims to inspire a more immediate sense of belief. Both writers explain that the absurd is an 
obstacle to understanding the meaning of life, that it involves the inability of reason to grasp 
that meaning, and describes the mind’s recoil from the attempt. In each case, the subject is left 
with the conclusion that life has no ostensible meaning and that his or her existence has no 
purpose. Kierkegaard uses this despair to justify the leap of faith, but Camus was unsatisfied 
with any solution that demeaned reason. His writing on the absurd was shadowed by the 
Second World War and its ideological fallout. It was a socio-political climate pervaded with 
disillusionment, and his work confronted this directly by questioning the value of human life. 
However, despite his conclusion that life is ostensibly meaningless he was careful to avoid 
nihilism. For Camus, the apparent meaninglessness of life increases the need for agency and 
self-determination, and he aims to encourage his readers not to live complacent and deluded 
lives. To achieve this, his works explore the absurd and its ethical consequences through a 
variety of lenses, each forming a detailed picture of how one can live with the knowledge of 
the absurd. Taking a chronological trajectory through his philosophical writing and then his 
fictional works, this chapter presents a thorough examination Camus’s idea of the absurd. 
 Camus’s absurd describes a conflict of reason that is born of the human desire to seek 
meaning in the universe. For Camus, the comprehension of this meaning would endow the 
individual with a profound sense of unity with the world and within existence. Apparently this 
unity would bring with it immense happiness and satisfaction. For Camus, this meaning, ‘the 
meaning of life’, is not only desirable, it is ‘the most urgent of questions’.122 With Camus’s 
absurd, the reasoning faculty of the mind attempts to discern an inherent meaning in existence, 
however the immediate universe offers no proof. The reasoning mind can only seek proof 
objectively in the given world of facts. For Camus, this world merely exists as it is, profoundly 
indifferent to and ignorant of not only us as humans, but our desire to discern meaning from 
it. Camus’s essay, The Myth of Sisyphus, sets as its task the elucidation of the possibility of living 
in the face of the realisation of the absurd. It contains one of the most lucid explications of his, 
at times circumstantially varied, concept of the absurd: 
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At this point of his effort man stands face to face with the irrational. He feels within 
him his longing for happiness and for reason. The absurd is born of this confrontation 
between the human need and the unreasonable silence of the world.123 
 
In the same manner that Kierkegaard’s idea of the absurd describes logic’s rejection of the 
paradoxes of faith, Camus’s absurd is the logical mind’s rebound from its attempt to divine 
meaning from the universe of facts. The absurd has nothing to do with either the human mind 
or the universe individually, it is the ‘intellectual malady’ born of their attempt at marriage.124 
As Camus states: ‘The absurd is essentially a divorce. It lies in neither of the elements 
compared; it is born of their confrontation.’125 Unlike Kierkegaard’s absurd, however, Camus 
does not view faith as an ultimate goal. His goal is to understand the meaning of life. Hence 
when the absurd is generated in the attempt to understand this meaning, the only available 
direction for the mind to move is backward to the given world. The only conclusion than can 
be reached from this ordeal is the realisation that the meaning of life is impossible to 
understand. Ostensibly, life is meaningless.126  
 While Camus’s assumption that life is meaningless appears to provoke certain nihilistic 
undertones, it does not necessarily assert the total meaninglessness of existence. It is the 
realisation that if there were a meaning, or greater knowledge of life and existence, it is simply 
unavailable to the human intellect.127 Camus denies the option of faith, but this is does not 
mean that his brand of nihilism is embraced by choice. Camus’s denial of faith represents a 
refusal to surrender the supremacy of the intellect when it is confronted by the challenge of the 
absurd.128 The fact that reason cannot be surrendered dictates that any conclusions made after 
an encounter with the absurd must be entirely based within finite earthly existence.129 For 
Camus, these conclusions infer an absolute responsibility for one’s actions and their 
consequences. This responsibility carries with it the fact that one’s destiny is entirely predicated 
by one’s actions.130 As such, Camus holds that what we do in this life is of paramount 
importance. If any meaning is to be found in life, it is in human action. The realisation of the 
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absurd includes the fact that the universe is completely indifferent to humanity’s need for 
meaning. Our actions are completely inconsequential. The world exists, and so do humans.131 
Whatever humans do in this world is in no way permitted or forbidden by the world itself. As 
such, moral commitments and human aspirations are entirely superfluous. There can be no 
universal justification for any act, good or bad.132 If the universe offers no justification for 
human action, then this justification has to be found in oneself. This moral autonomy, 
combined with the realisation of the invalidity of communal moral norms, can be viewed as a 
justification for total nihilistic abandon. Troubled by this conclusion, Camus formulates within 
The Myth of Sisyphus a description of the life of what he calls the absurd man.  
 Living in the face of the absurd involves the acceptance of the meaninglessness of 
living.133 With the knowledge of this meaninglessness comes the realisation that there is no 
reason for living. Camus calls this living ‘without appeal’.134 The central problematic of The 
Myth of Sisyphus is the question of whether it is possible to live without appeal. If living without 
appeal entails the knowledge that there is no reason for living, then it is possible to assume that 
life is not worth living. In the famous opening lines of the essay, Camus indicates the 
problematic effects of such an assumption: ‘There is but one truly serious philosophical 
problem and that is suicide. Judging whether life is or is not worth living amounts to answering 
the fundamental question of philosophy.’135 Despite the strength of this assertion at the 
beginning of the essay, Camus is quick to denounce the solution of suicide. He argues that 
suicide does not solve the problem of the absurd—it merely eliminates one of the absurd’s 
constitutive elements.136 Suicide does not solve the absurd because the absurd is a problem. 
Suicide is giving up and giving up does not solve problems, it avoids them. The absurd is 
confronted when a living person seeks meaning that transcends life. If the person is no longer 
living, no transcendental meaning is sought, and the absurd disappears.  
In a manner of speaking, suicide does settle the absurd, because it is no longer a 
possible reaction generated by the reason of an existing person. Cancelling life settles the 
absurd only in the sense that without life the absurd ceases to be.137 Without life, the absurd is 
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not the absurd: ‘Negating one of the terms of the opposition on which he lives amounts to 
escaping it… [it] is to elude the problem… Suicide is a repudiation.’138 For Camus, this 
repudiation reduces the urgency of the question of meaning in existence by avoiding the 
problem that this search encounters. Apart from commonly held beliefs that suicide is 
irrational, Camus’s treatment of suicide as a response to the absurd uncovers a deeper 
incongruence of logic. If one kills oneself because of the conclusions of the absurd, their act of 
suicide devalues the inherent value of life placed on it through the process of questioning. Seen 
this way, suicide involves a disregard for existential meaning. The desire for meaning exposes 
an inherent value on life. Suicide is not an adequate response to the absurd because it devalues 
life. Suicide, therefore, devalues the absurd. It is a supreme transgression of logic to kill oneself 
over something that one does not value, and as Camus asserts, the absurd is the product of 
relentless logic.  
Another means of settling the absurd is faith. Kierkegaard asserts that the absurd 
necessitates the leap to faith, a subjective incorporation of the absurd. However, for Camus 
this is a solution just as problematic as suicide. In fact, Camus’s repudiation is so strong that he 
calls faith ‘philosophical suicide’.139 By philosophical suicide, Camus refers not specifically to 
Kierkegaard’s existential faith but to any attitude that attempts to resolve the absurd through 
an all-encompassing theory of existence.140 Such theories, through their total explanation of 
life, inherently solve the absurd by explaining away its parameters. Camus singles out several 
philosophical and phenomenological theories for attack but the most useful one here is 
Kierkegaard’s, due to his contribution to the lineage of the idea of the absurd. 
 For Camus the absurd is produced through a relentless pursuit of logic. Kierkegaard’s 
suggestion that the irrationality of faith can be accepted as a result of the objective uncertainty 
of subjective experience cannot be justified in Camus’s view. To accept the shortcomings of 
logic is to abandon logic. According to Camus, ‘what Kierkegaard calls for quite plainly is… 
“The sacrifice of the intellect.”’141 With a method bordering on circular reasoning, Kierkegaard 
implements the absurd as a justification for the leap to faith. This is close to answering a 
question with a question, or asserting that two wrongs make a right.142 In Camus’s view this 
reasoning is unacceptable. The sacrifice of logic not only amounts to philosophical suicide, but 
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what might be more accurately described as intellectual suicide. For Camus, Kierkegaard’s 
solution rewards quitters: ‘“In his failure,” says Kierkegaard, “the believer finds his 
triumph.”’143 Camus denies that faith is an outcome of the encounter with the absurd.144 He 
asserts that a truly logical approach cannot resort to begging questions of the infinite, the 
comprehension of which is beyond human reasoning. Camus’s absurd sits entirely within the 
scope of human perception, and cannot be transformed into ‘eternity’s springboard’.145 The 
use of the absurd as a justification for an acceptance of the irrational removes its links with 
human logic, and eliminates its status as an intellectual malady.146  
For Camus, a solution to the absurd must be indubitable. In Camus’s view, 
Kierkegaard’s haste to justify the leap of faith stems from his fiercely Christian upbringing.147 
This may account for what Camus perceives as his unrelenting desire to resolve the absurd in 
faith: ‘Kierkegaard wants to be cured. To be cured is his frenzied wish and it runs throughout 
his whole journal. The entire effort of his intelligence is to escape the antimony of the human 
condition.’148 Faith provides relief for the tension of the absurd. It is an illogical cure for a 
crisis of logic. The absurd is a logical truth that carries with it a great anxiety. Faith is a salve 
for this anxiety. In Camus’s view, Kierkegaard is too hasty to find a desirable solution to the 
absurd. In the opening passages of Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard poses the question, ‘If man 
had no eternal consciousness… what would life be but despair?’149 This question, or rather, 
statement, reveals Kierkegaard’s unwillingness to accept the possibility that life could be 
meaningless. In response, Camus states: ‘This cry is not likely to stop the absurd man. Seeking 
what is true is not seeking what is desirable.’150 Indeed, the assumption that life is meaningless 
is far from desirable. But regarding the meaning of life, pursuing a course of pure logic ad 
absurdum can only have one possible outcome. For Camus, if despair is the lot of the logical 
then so be it: 
 
If in order to elude the anxious question: ‘What would life be?’ one must, like the 
donkey, feed on the roses of illusion, then the absurd mind, rather than resigning itself 
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to falsehood, prefers to adopt fiercely Kierkegaard’s reply: ‘despair’. Everything 
considered, a determined soul will always manage.151 
 
However dissatisfying this conclusion may be, it is the only one that can be reached using 
Camus’s logical approach. Any other solution would be, as he puts it, an illusion. This 
conclusion leaves the logical mind with only one possible solution to the absurd, acceptance.152 
Camus’s acceptance, despite the word’s implications, does not infer resignation or consent. 
This type of acceptance becomes abject nihilism. Instead, Camus’s acceptance forms the basis 
of what he considers to be the only defensible position that the absurd man can assume, revolt. 
 Accepting the absurd does not entail surrender. For Camus, the assumption that life is 
meaningless is a truth, however inconvenient. But this does not infer that life must be lived 
devoid of objective or justification. Camus also asserts that the absurd must not be forgotten. 
Like a well-earned battle scar, it should be constantly held as a truth, even revered. It should 
always be held as a reminder that there is no hope of a transcendental solution to the lack of 
meaning of human life. Furthermore, it should be renounced. The absurd cannot defeat the 
human desire for meaning. After all, the absurd is not a lack of meaning, it is the reaction to 
the discovery of no apparent meaning. By the same token, the absurd assures that no meaning 
will ever be found outside what is available to the intellect. But for Camus, this is no reason to 
give up. His brand of acceptance thus becomes a ceaseless battle with the absurd: 
 
I must admit that that struggle implies a total absence of hope (which has nothing to 
do with despair), a continual rejection (which must not be confused with renunciation), 
and a conscious dissatisfaction (which must not be compared to immature unrest). 
Everything that destroys, conjures away, or exercises these requirements (and, to begin 
with, consent which overthrows divorce) ruins the absurd and devalues the attitude 
that may then be proposed.153 
 
If the absurd is a divorce, then consent settles the rift between the two elements. Settled, the 
absurd is neutralised and no longer the absurd. Camus asserts that if we do not commit either 
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form of suicide, then the absurd must be kept alive.154 Understood in this way, we must live in 
spite of the absurd, which is what Camus calls metaphysical revolt. In The Myth of Sisyphus, the 
concept of metaphysical revolt is not realised without a struggle.155 In an attempt to outline the 
life of an absurd man that is not categorised by ambivalent nihilism, Camus draws a few 
characters that may best exemplify the principles of metaphysical revolt. These characters, 
loosely summarised as the lover, the actor and the conqueror, come across as ironically 
detached and solipsistic. Their heroism in the face of the absurd is their understanding of the 
meaninglessness of existence, as well as the awareness of their concrete existence and 
mortality.156 This mode of existence, while true to Camus’s motives, appears to condone a not 
necessarily immoral but amoral take on life. When individual freedom becomes paramount, the 
possibility arises for these liberties to clash between individuals. Seen in certain ways this 
approach seems to allow murder, brutality and deceit.157 Apparently bothered by this, Camus 
changes his tune in later works. His task then becomes the elucidation of a form of 
metaphysical revolt that involves an element of human solidarity.  
 In works such as The Rebel, The Plague and the posthumously published Resistance, 
Rebellion and Death (1961), Camus reveals a more unified idea of metaphysical revolt. Contrary 
to the varied and undirected revolt of previous works, the more recent texts exhibit an ethic of 
human responsibility that transcends the nihilistic undertones of the absurd man.158 These 
rebels are still driven by a spirit of freedom and are personally responsible for their actions and 
values. If the search for transcendental meaning only encounters the absurd, then meaning 
must be sought within immanence, or the destiny that we as humans choose for ourselves.159 
Because our immanent existence and fate consist of our actions, it is therefore our 
responsibility to make these actions meaningful. In this way humans can bring meaning into 
their lives. With the absurd constantly in mind, this self-made meaning becomes revolt. If the 
absurd is oppression, a denial of existential meaning, then the creation of an alternative 
meaning is a challenge to the absurd’s authority. Like the revolutionary, the metaphysical rebel 
perceives an oppressive fate and decides to create his or her own. With this sense of freedom 
and responsibility also comes the awareness that this situation is universal. These rebels 
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acknowledge that all humans are in the same metaphysical situation. The absurd is an ever-
present fact of existence. Its cold refusal of meaning is born of an indifferent universe. The 
absurd does not justify itself, it merely is. As such, the absurd is indifferent to the human 
notion of justice. Humanly apprehended, the absurd is unjust. Camus’s idea of solidarity in 
metaphysical revolt is born of this injustice. According to Camus, ‘man must exalt justice in 
order to fight against eternal injustice, create happiness in order to protest against the universe 
of unhappiness.’160 If the meaninglessness of life is an injustice against humans, then the action 
of revolt is centred in the human desire for justice. The universe is indifferent to our desire for 
meaning, and as such it provides none. By that reasoning Camus asserts that if any meaning is 
to be found, it is to be found in humanity. If it is the responsibility of humans to create their 
own meaning, then the only meaning that will ever be found will come from humans. If 
human meaning is created, then humanity must be preserved. Thus Camus’s idea of a living a 
life without appeal becomes increasingly benevolent:  
 
I continue to believe that this world has no ultimate meaning. But I know that 
something in it has meaning and that is man, because he is the only creature to insist 
on having one. This world has at least the truth of man, and our task is to provide its 
justification against fate itself. And it has no justification but man; hence he must be 
saved if we want to save the idea we have of life.161 
 
With the absurd’s defeat of reason comes the recognition that the only truths of existence are 
human. Transcendental absolutes do not fit within the scope of the rational mind and are 
therefore unjustifiable. If the only truths are human truths, then they are intrinsically linked to 
humans.162 Therefore the preservation of humanity and human freedom is the only justifiable 
action after the encounter with the absurd. 
 Various reactions to the absurd can be seen throughout Camus’s oeuvre. The Outsider 
(1942) reflects a state of isolation that stems from the moral ambiguity of its central character. 
An unlikely hero, Meursault has gained the insight that life is meaningless.163 Coupled with the 
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realisation that life is meaningless is the fact that nothing matters. As such Meursault is 
indifferent to the moral demands of society, his sole commitment is to the immanent 
experience of his life.164 At the beginning of the novel Meursault is informed of his mother’s 
death. Upon hearing the news and during his attendance at the various funeral events he 
neither exhibits nor experiences any grief. He is indifferent to the fact of his mother’s passing, 
and he refuses to mimic the actions or words of a grieving son. Meursault’s commitment to 
immediate existence reflects absolute authenticity. Because his only passion is living in the 
first-person, his absolute is immediate truth.165 As Camus states, ‘he refuses to lie. To lie is not 
only to say what isn’t true. It is also and above all, to say more than is true, and, as far as the 
human heart is concerned, to express more than one feels.’166 Because he is unwilling to lie, 
Meursault refuses to feign grief. This refusal creates a tension with the expectations of society. 
As Camus puts it, ‘he does not play the game. In this respect, he is foreign to the society in 
which he lives’.167 Meursault’s refusal to play the game culminates when he is sentenced to 
death for killing a man. The murder itself could be considered an act of self-defence given the 
fact that the victim was carrying a knife. But his evident indifference and passivity during the 
trial causes the prosecutor to focus more on Meursault’s antisocial behaviour. His lack of grief 
at his mother’s funeral becomes the main point of argument and eventually the trial becomes a 
judgement of Meursault’s general character. The prosecutor accuses Meursault of being 
‘morally guilty for his mother’s death’ and that because of this he ‘has no place in a community 
whose basic principles he flouts without compunction.’168 Meursault’s unwillingness to 
participate in facetious moral appearance thus causes his condemnation.  
Camus’s aim in the novel is to illustrate the weight society places on these essentially 
superfluous moral veneers. As he states: ‘In our society any man who does not weep at his 
mother’s funeral runs the risk of being sentenced to death.’169 Aware of the meaninglessness of 
existence, Meursault’s only commitment is to authentic existence. His authenticity is 
immediacy, therefore he has no time for the ephemeral expectations of human communication 
and interaction. These expectations are not only ill-defined but unspoken, a transcendent code 
of conduct that one is expected to adhere to. Because this ephemeral code has nothing to do 
																																																						
164 Glicksburg, The Tragic Vision, 56. 
165 Sagi, Albert Camus, 53. 
166 Albert Camus, cited in ibid., 89-90. 
167 Ibid. 
168 Camus, The Outsider, 102. 
169 Camus, cited in Sagi, Albert Camus, 89. 
47 
 
with an absolute engagement with individual existence, Meursault perceives it as unnecessary 
and refuses to play along. From a romantic standpoint, Meursault’s case could be the story of a 
man who refused to lie and was condemned for it. As Camus puts it, he ‘agrees to die for the 
truth.’170 While The Outsider may not refer explicitly to Camus’s concept of the absurd—he 
reserves the term for his essays—it adds to the understanding of the life of the absurd man. It 
communicates what is involved in accepting the absurd and with it the meaninglessness of life 
and its contents. Meursault personifies the problematic nature of nihilism in the face of the 
absurd, even to the point where he fully accepts his early death as a matter of indifference.171 
An action is merely an action, with no meaning or consequences assigned to it. Meursault’s 
nihilism does not justify or condone any action, and as such any action is possible. The Outsider 
serves as a warning. It alludes to the consequences of a life without appeal undertaken solely 
on one’s own terms. It warns against the anarchy of nihilism. 
 Central to The Rebel is the problem of murder.172 The individual freedom granted by the 
realisation of the absurd is problematic in its moral ambivalence and could be seen to condone 
murder. To illustrate this, as well as other outcomes, Camus points to three possible reactions 
to the absurd, each in some way allowing murder. The first is the nihilistic approach. 
Embodied by Meursault, this approach is characterised by moral ambivalence: ‘If we believe in 
nothing, if nothing has any meaning and we can affirm no values whatsoever, then everything 
is possible and nothing has any importance.’173 This response allows murder because all values 
are relative since life is meaningless. The individual has supreme freedom after the realisation 
that life has no meaning. If life has no meaning then the religious values that inform moral 
codes are illegitimate. There is no sin because there is no God. Camus even states in The Myth 
of Sisyphus that the absurd is sin without God.174 Indeed, this concept is absurd even in the 
traditional sense of the word. If there is no sin, anything is possible. Nothing requires 
justification or condemnation because life is meaningless. Without God the idea of sin is 
ridiculous. This does not infer that murder is specifically encouraged, but its moral 
consequences are non-existent because nothing matters.175  
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The second response to the absurd resembles the first but with an added element of 
passivity. Camus briefly outlines this as inaction: ‘We shall then decide not to act at all, which 
amounts to at least accepting the murder of others, with perhaps certain mild reservations 
about the imperfection of the human race.’176 This response of inaction permits indifference to 
the acts of others that cause death or suffering.177 The third reaction is the adoption of a more 
unified, directed purpose of existence. Camus’s treatment of this response implies a sense of 
unity among individuals rallying together for the purpose of efficacious action. This could be 
taken a number of ways, global capitalism could easily fall under this banner, but it appears 
that Camus is referring to political ideologies such as Nazism.178 As he states: ‘Since nothing is 
either true or false, good or bad, our guiding principle will be to demonstrate that we are the 
most efficient—in other words, the strongest. Then the world will no longer be divided into 
the just and the unjust, but into masters and slaves.’179 While this approach does not 
specifically entail murder, there is an implication that murder could be justified in the name of 
efficiency. At any rate, Camus sums up the three nihilistic responses by stating that each allows 
murder.180 Nihilism seems a natural assumption after the apprehension of the absurd. But as 
Camus illustrates, each potential form of nihilism involves or allows some form of brutality. In 
order to avoid becoming the spokesman for a potentially destructive ideology, Camus sets out 
the terms for an absurdist approach to the problems of the absurd. 
 In The Rebel Camus argues that an absurdist attitude must condemn murder. As 
discussed in The Myth of Sisyphus, suicide is not a viable solution to the absurd because it 
eliminates one of the terms of the conflict. The repudiation of suicide in the absurdist attitude 
thus indicates that human life is of undeniable value: ‘Murder cannot be made coherent when 
suicide is not considered coherent.’181 Without human life, the absurd does not exist, and 
Camus asserts that we must keep the absurd alive. As such, the nihilistic attitude derived from 
the encounter with the absurd cannot be supported within Camus’s absurdist reasoning. 
Camus asserts: ‘But it is obvious that absurdism hereby admits that human life is the only 
necessary good since it is precisely life that makes this encounter possible and since, without 
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life, the absurdist wager would have no basis.’182 Murder and suicide both involve death, and 
the absurd can only be reached by a conscious logical effort of a living human being. 
Involved in the realisation of the absurd is the desire for justice. The enquiring mind 
that encounters the absurd is seeking order. The harmony sought by the mind exposes a desire 
for justice, or at least a sense of justice.183 Camus holds that even after the realisation that life is 
ostensibly meaningless there is room for human sympathy. One cannot prevent another from 
the realisation of the absurd when the desire that exposed the absurd also carried with it the 
desire for justice. As Camus states: ‘How is it possible… to preserve exclusively for oneself the 
benefits of such a process of reasoning? From the moment that life is recognised as good, it 
becomes good for all men.’184 The apprehension of the absurd exposes a desire for unity and 
order.185 Nihilistic responses undermine this desire and cannot be supported with an absurdist 
reasoning. In The Rebel, revolt against the injustice of the absurd becomes a revolt against the 
injustice of life in general. This metaphysical revolt, as distinct from the revolt against 
metaphysics in The Myth of Sisyphus, is a rejection of the meaninglessness of life exposed in the 
absurd.186 As discussed, Camus holds that human life is the only meaningful phenomenon in 
the universe, and as such it is oppressed by death. Metaphysical revolt in this sense then 
becomes a revolt against suffering and death.187  
 The Plague is perhaps Camus’s most lucid work in exposing the human struggle against 
suffering and death. Informed by his idea of revolt, the novel celebrates the solidarity and 
camaraderie involved in the battle against an unjust and unstoppable force. The plot details the 
efforts of Dr Rieux, a physician practicing in a town that becomes infected with bubonic 
plague. Rieux is determined to fight, albeit vainly, the unpredictable and untreatable disease. 
Eventually citizens gather to form health teams in an effort to aid Rieux and stymie the 
plague’s progress. As Tony Judt remarks in his introduction, the correlations between this 
fictional plague and Camus’s absurd are unmistakable.188 Treatment against the plague is 
ineffective. Regardless of various preventative health measures and quarantine the infection 
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rate increases inexorably.189 The quarantine causes separation and exile. It creates alienation like 
that of Meursault and a desire for unity like that which prompts the absurd.190 Because the 
plague cannot be treated it cannot be understood. The plague, like the absurd, is 
incomprehensible. The disease is unjust, uncompromising and ineluctable, as is the absurd. 
After the gates are sealed in quarantine the inhabitants of the town under its siege have no 
escape and little to no means of avoiding its oppression. Because the plague is unavoidable and 
undiscriminating the townspeople share a common fate, just as all humans are dominated by 
the absurd. The struggle against the plague is futile, so is the human search for meaning that 
leads to the absurd.191 Camus’s realisation of revolt in the face of the absurd is mirrored in The 
Plague. Rieux characterises the ethics of rebellion in his refusal to submit to the whims of the 
disease. Instead he chooses to fight the plague completely aware of the superfluity of his 
actions.192 Similarly, the metaphysical rebel continues to refute the absurd by creating his or her 
own meaning in a universe that does not supply one, and is completely indifferent to such 
efforts.  
The formation of the health teams embodies Camus’s idea of human solidarity in the 
face of universal injustice. If saving humankind is the ultimate meaning for Camus, then the 
health teams in The Plague establish this paradigm at its most literal level. Bound together by an 
inescapable and unjust predicament, their only possible course of action is to attempt to relieve 
suffering. Their only motivation is compassion.193 Like those living without appeal in the face 
of the absurd, Rieux and his comrades cannot appeal for divine assistance. Their predicament 
is very much within the temporal. As Rieux comments in the novel: ‘We are working together 
for something that unites us at a higher level than prayer or blasphemy, and that’s all that 
counts.’194 Echoing Kierkegaard, the town preacher ultimately agrees by admitting that the 
plague is a universal evil that humans must face without God’s assistance.195 Following this 
logic he joins Rieux in his efforts. Other characters join the health teams for their own reasons. 
Tarrou, a travelling man of leisure, is motivated purely by a hatred of condemnation, 
carelessness and death. His reasoning is that humans can easily pass judgement on one another 
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in moments of weakness.196 In this situation of mass infection his sentiments become tangible 
and he is driven to act by forming the health teams. Whatever their motivation, the characters 
in The Plague that formed the health teams chose to resist an unstoppable and irrational force. 
This resistance bound them.  
For Camus what is important about this act of communal rebellion is its 
acknowledgement of individual and collective responsibility in what is essentially a hopeless 
situation.197 Individual rebellion has nihilistic and thereby dangerous potential, but communal 
rebellion involves solidarity in a shared ethic of action. The health teams offer what is, thus far, 
the only ethically justifiable response to the acknowledgement of the absurd. This response 
does not carry with it an unquestionable transcendental meaning of life. The meaning sought 
before the apprehension of the absurd cannot be provided. The meaning that is provided by 
communal revolt is temporary, volatile and variable but at least it can be considered a meaning. 
If logic suppresses the ability for humanity to find transcendental meaning, then meaning must 
be sought on this earth. This meaning must be found in humanity itself, in a world pervaded 
by misery and inevitable death. Rieux and the health teams struggle against misery and death 
while they can be struggled against. As the narrator, later identified as Rieux himself, explains: 
‘Rieux felt he was on the right path, in struggling against the world as it was.’198 This struggle is 
imperfect, and given human mortality, ultimately futile.  
In The Myth of Sisyphus, Camus calls upon the eponymous figure of Greek mythology, 
ceaselessly hauling a boulder to the top of a hill, only to repeat the task endlessly. This 
existence is exemplary of any individual who, after acknowledging the absurd, agrees to live a 
life without appeal. If life is to be lived after it is revealed as ostensibly meaningless then any 
action or cause is irrefutably futile. In the case of Rieux, his task is healing those who will 
eventually die. It is futile but it is the only task that he deems worth doing: ‘I am defending 
them as best I can, that’s all.’199 Tarrou acknowledges this futility by replying: ‘I can 
understand. But your victories will always be temporary’.200 To which Rieux asserts: ‘Always, I 
know that. But that is not a reason to give up the struggle.’201 Similarly, in the last lines of The 
Myth of Sisyphus Camus proclaims that ‘the struggle itself towards the heights is enough to fill a 
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man’s heart. One must imagine Sisyphus happy’.202 For Rieux, this happiness comes from the 
fact that his task is not only justifiable but also worthwhile, at least for the time being. Camus’s 
summation in both works is the acceptance of a meaningless fate combined with an absolute 
refusal to submit to this fate. His logic is nearly paradoxical, but it is in one way or another 
logically justifiable. Like Rieux with the plague, Camus not only apprehended the absurd but 
also insisted on bearing its implications throughout all of his works. His battle with the absurd, 
like Rieux’s battle with death, was unwinnable—but also like Rieux, he prevailed nevertheless. 
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Chapter Three: Michel Houellebecq 
 
The work of Michel Houellebecq details the extreme consequences of the absurd in the 
contemporary world. His writing follows the tradition of Camus, but is emptied of any sense 
of heroism. He consistently emphasises how the structure of Western society inexorably leads 
to the despair of individuals. In Houellebecq’s universe, the autonomy granted by the loss of 
faith has evolved into self-interest. Due to the abundance of this self-interest and the alienating 
nature of late capitalism, the desires that fuel contemporary life are impossible to satisfy. The 
pursuit of happiness is therefore futile. His characters live in despair and experience its worst 
repercussions, and these conditions extend to such a great proportion of society that disaster 
becomes inevitable. Houellebecq’s dead end of contemporary existence is based on a single 
idea, that due to our circumstances we are incapable of making our own lives meaningful. This 
idea is intrinsic to the absurd, but differs in its focus on individual wellbeing rather than 
transcendental meaning. Like Camus, Houellebecq focuses on a need for community—but this 
is less out of a need for metaphysical revolt and more due to the fact that our lives are 
dysfunctional without it. Houellebecq’s absurd is more immediate, but the dynamics are the 
same, and it shares the same cause in the loss of faith and affirmation of reason. This chapter 
will break down the various themes of his work into sections that examine how they contribute 
to a contemporary understanding of the absurd.  
 
The Decline of Religion and the Rise of Individualism 
Houellebecq’s ideas are founded in the opposition between reason and religion. In his 
recent review of Submission (2015), Mark Lilla identifies the origins of Houellebecq’s social 
critique in the Enlightenment.203 He suggests that Houellebecq’s novels present societies where 
the insistence on individual liberties championed by the Enlightenment has precipitated 
detrimental effects.204 This view is supported by a recent interview in which Houellebecq 
articulates his dismissal of Enlightenment values and how this is reflected in the plot of the 
book.205 The Enlightenment’s rejection of medieval submission to the church and the feudal 
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system emphasised human individuality, and promoted philosophical enquiry outside the 
regulative structures of dogma, instigating a more rational engagement with religion.206 Reason 
and autonomy were asserted over the governing logic of religious doctrine or divine purpose.207 
Immanuel Kant summarises these central motivations succinctly when he states: ‘Have courage 
to use your own mind! Thus is the motto of Enlightenment.’208 The assertions of the 
Enlightenment undermined those of Christianity and encouraged their critique, thus denying 
its claims to the ultimate aim of life.209 Obedience, duty, and faith became secondary to 
freedom, equality, and reason. These conditions led to the decreasing influence of the church 
in Western society, what Nietzsche described as the death of God, and what can be 
understood as the beginning of secular modernity.  
Houellebecq’s criticism of the Enlightenment has to do with its affirmation of 
individual reason and liberty, and this is the first intersection between his work and the absurd. 
It is Enlightenment thinking that led to the recognition of the absurd by Kierkegaard and 
Camus, who separately debated the rational legitimacy of faith and the repercussions of its 
absence. They identify that the loss of religious meaning in life is irredeemable. Houellebecq’s 
ideas are also inspired by the implications of the decreasing influence of religion in personal 
life. As he states: ‘The death of God in the West was the prelude to an extraordinary 
metaphysical soap opera, and one that’s still running today… To date, all these attempts to 
make sense of the world have failed, and unhappiness keeps on spreading.’210 Houellebecq’s 
novels take place near the conclusion of this ‘metaphysical soap opera’. His view is that the 
blind faith in human capacity has allowed for the recognition of its inadequacy to give life 
meaning, and people are unhappy as a result.   
Houellebecq believes that the Enlightenment’s emphasis on personal freedom has had 
a detrimental effect on our wellbeing. This idea is not uncommon among European scholars, 
who in various ways argue that the Enlightenment’s legacy of liberalism has led to 
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contemporary moral and political crisis.211 For Mark Lilla, Houellebecq shares this ‘very 
persistent European worry that the single-minded pursuit of freedom—freedom from tradition 
and authority, freedom to pursue one’s own ends—must inevitably lead to disaster.’212 This 
disaster can be seen in Houellebecq’s depiction of contemporary society, where the social 
liberalism instigated by the Enlightenment has come to dominate personal life. The single-
minded pursuit of individual desires has become the guiding principle of contemporary 
existence. For Houellebecq, this freedom does not entail happiness, but rather anxiety and 
despair.213 In his view the Enlightenment’s insistence on reason and individual freedom, and 
the resulting decrease of religion, brought about adverse social conditions. At the core of 
Houellebecq’s criticism of contemporary society is the seeming paradox that greater freedom 
affords greater unhappiness. 
 The liberation movements of the 1960s, particularly the sexual revolution, are the next 
major targets for Houellebecq’s critique. He views this moment and its consequences as a 
natural extension of the liberal ideals of the Enlightenment. His treatment of the ideas and 
people of this generation is scathing, frequently emphasising their callous self-interest. These 
ideas are best expressed in his second novel, Atomised (1998), which relates an account of 
parental abandonment and its repercussions on children. Early in the novel the narrator 
outlines Janine Ceccaldi’s life during the 1960s, when she ‘enjoys to the full the sexually 
liberated existence of an affluent young woman in the western counter-culture’.214 Although 
the novel’s main characters are Janine’s children, her decisions in this period are central to the 
plot. As the narrator states, she belongs to a social caste that are ‘catalysts… of social 
breakdown’.215 While living in Paris and studying medicine she falls pregnant to a budding 
plastic surgeon. With palpable irony, Houellebecq describes their decision to have the child as 
being governed more by the desire for novelty rather than commitment and love. He writes: 
‘Janine and Serge were what would later be called a “modern” couple; her pregnancy was 
something of an accident. She decided, however, to have the child, believing that maternity 
was something every woman should experience.’216 Soon after giving birth to a son, the pair 
decides that ‘the burden of caring for a small child was incompatible with their personal 
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freedom’.217 They agree to send their son to Algeria to live with his maternal grandmother, and 
soon separate. By this stage Janine is pregnant to another man, a filmmaker named Marc 
Djerzinski, and she gives birth to another boy. After suddenly returning home and finding 
their infant son left alone in horrifically neglectful circumstances, Marc decides to send the 
child to his Grandmother, and the couple separate. Three years later he disappears while on a 
remote documentary shoot in occupied Tibet. By this stage Janine is living in an American 
hippie commune, and the two boys grow up with their respective carers, very rarely seeing 
their mother.  
In Houellebecq’s view, far from bringing individuals together, the sexual revolution 
was actually the catalyst for increased social isolation. As he states: ‘It is interesting to note that 
the “sexual revolution” is usually portrayed as a communist utopia, whereas in fact it was 
simply another stage in the rise of the individual.’218 In Atomised, Houllebecq charts this 
trajectory with Janine’s multiple sexual partners and the children that result. Each time she 
starts a new family, her ideals of personal freedom compel her to seek out new possibilities for 
personal fulfilment. Houellebecq treats Janine’s actions as symptomatic of a larger social 
phenomenon. He identifies this as the rise of individualism as it increased with the 
developments of the second half of the twentieth century. It is at this point in time that he 
believes individual interests replaced responsibility and the remaining bonds between 
individuals were severed, thus eschewing any purpose greater than the self and contingent 
pleasures.219 Leonidas Donskis observes that: ‘Houellebecq’s novel lays bare the death of God 
in a rather unexpected way: He dies as social and human ties are snuffed out.’220 Here Donskis 
isolates the exact manner in which the sexual revolution and liberalism contribute to 
Houellebecq’s association with the absurd. The diminishing influence of religion led to the 
recognition of the absurd, and for Houellebecq, to the breakdown of relationships that led to 
increased personal unhappiness.  
Despite being primarily occupied with current society, his ideas begin with the decline 
of religion and the loss of its transcendental meaning. In the case of the absurd, this 
transcendental meaning is the meaning of life; for Houellebecq it is the interpersonal bonds, 
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duty, and love encouraged by religion. Houellebecq’s absurd is a contemporary condition, and 
his death of God is the breakdown of the family. The independence afforded by the decrease 
in religion allowed for the perception of existential solitude and doubt in human agency. 
Similarly, the freedoms that led to and resulted from the destruction of family ties exposed the 
individual to the realities of their isolation from other human beings and the loneliness that 
this entails. Contained within both cases is the irony that that independence and reason seem 
to imply the promise of happiness and liberation, but instead lead to despair. Houellebecq 
observes that the ideal of self-fulfilment cannot be met by human capacity. 
 
The Individual and the Market  
Houellebecq sees marketing as responsible for the domination of contemporary life by 
insatiable sexual desire. Sex is blatantly implemented as a fundamental marketing strategy in the 
media that saturates our lives, and for him it is precisely this constant stream of sexualised 
images that characterises a sort of ‘sexual injunction’, an idea consistently represented in his 
works.221 He describes a culture constantly repeating the litany that: ‘You must desire. You 
must be desirable. You must participate in the competition, the struggle, the life of the world. 
If you stop, you will no longer exist. If you stay behind, you’re dead.’222 Houellebecq sees 
contemporary culture as being driven by a need for desirability, and that the constraints of 
sexual interaction have been widened to such a degree that this has become a need to be 
desired by everyone. It is a generalised desire to be desired, which comes as a result of the 
emotional vacuum of personal life. 
In Houellebecq’s work the liberation of sexuality has led to its increased 
commodification, and this has led in turn to greater anxiety. The increased frequency of 
possible sexual encounters has extended the competition inherent to seduction and courtship 
to a lifelong endeavour. The greater the number of potential partners, the more selective one 
can be with whom they pursue, thus introducing a capitalistic character to sexuality. In 
Atomised, Houellebecq states: ‘the couple and the family were to be the last bastion of primitive 
communism in a liberal society. The sexual revolution was to destroy the last unit separating 
the individual from the market. The destruction continues to this day.’223 In Houellebecq’s 
view the same laws that govern the free exchange of goods and services in a capitalist society 
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can now be applied to sexual relationships.224 Relationships are increasingly viewed as 
utilitarian exchanges of pleasure, and as such have come to resemble transactions within a 
market economy.225 The same principles that are applied to consumer goods then become 
applied to individuals. Desirability can come in two forms, either through physical beauty or 
monetary wealth, as both are able to provide maximum pleasure in their own ways.226 These 
attributes are of course highly exclusive, and as a result a hierarchy forms.227 At the top are the 
most beautiful and the wealthiest, and at the bottom are their opposites. Sexuality has become 
less associated with the idea of permanent devotion and love, and more focused on the 
satisfaction of immediate desire. This desire is felt by all, but only realised by some, and even 
then it is not without its disappointments. Thus Houellebecq’s identification of sexual 
consumerism emphasises its potential to create various social and psychological problems.  
The sexual marketplace of Houellebecq’s novels is the source of great unhappiness for 
his characters. Houellebecq’s commitment to this idea is explicitly expressed in his first novel 
Whatever (1994), which has the French title, Extension du domaine de la lute (extension of the 
domain of the struggle). He writes, ‘Economic liberalism is the extension of the domain of the 
struggle, its extension to all ages and all classes of society. Sexual liberalism is likewise an 
extension of the domain of the struggle, its extension to all ages and classes of society.’228 
Unfortunately for many of the narrators and central characters, they usually fall short of the 
standards required to compete. As the protagonist Renault reflects: ‘Just like unrestrained 
economic liberalism, and for similar reasons, sexual liberalism produces phenomena of 
absolute pauperisation. Some men make love every day; others five or six times in their life, or 
never… It’s what’s known as “the law of the market.”’229 According to Houellebecq, the 
extension of the range of possible partners for each individual has allowed for some to 
dominate at the expense of others. It is his apparent view that if monogamy were more widely 
observed, there would be better chances for those who may not immediately present the 
necessary charms to win the affections of a partner. There would be less of a struggle. 
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It is possible to see the absurd mirrored in Houellebecq’s idea of sexual pauperisation. 
The devaluation of emotional ties has exposed the individual to greater chances of 
unhappiness and solitude—much like the way the absurd reveals the futility and solitude of 
human life. But there is a further way in which Houellebecq’s ideas reflect the absurd. The 
unhappiness of Houellebecq’s characters is caused by their disappointment at being denied the 
pleasures of desirability because of their physical shortcomings. But this is not to say that those 
who are considered desirable do not also share the same disappointments. The promise of the 
market is that satisfaction is available, if not plentiful, but this is always contingent on the 
desires of another in order to be fulfilled. It cannot be assumed that the desires of one person 
will always be returned. The promise of the market cannot always be kept, demand does not 
guarantee supply, and there is no guarantee of permanence. This reflects the contradictory 
logic of individualism as Houellebecq describes it, and points to a fundamental dead end 
within his worldview. He identifies an unavoidable contradiction between desire and reality, 
and in this way it reflects the absurd. 
Houellebecq’s characters occasionally succeed in their attempts at sexual gratification, 
and these sex scenes are always related in dry and observational terms that resemble 
pornography. He does this to emphasise the superficial nature of uncommitted sexual 
relationships. This is evident in the way that they occur with abrupt immediacy and without the 
usual efforts of seduction and even dialogue to prepare the participants for the act.230 
Houellebecq’s sex just happens—it is mechanical intercourse that is neither communicative 
nor celebratory of a deeper sentiment, like love. Without greater significance or enduring 
commitment it is meaningless and temporary. To make these ideas more explicit, Houellebecq 
borrows many of pornography’s visual tropes.231 In an essay on the matter, Victoria Best and 
Martin Crowley identify his insistence on the visible male ejaculation, often onto the face or 
breasts of a female partner, as a key reference to porn imagery.232 Houellebecq uses the most 
blatant and superficial representation of sex to emphasise how contemporary relationships are 
much the same. 
Houellebecq’s reference to pornography also highlights his idea that sexuality has 
become capitalistic, since it is the most widespread form of the commodification of sex 
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itself.233 The objectification of human bodies is inherent to pornography, so he implements 
pornographic tropes to communicate the objectification of individuals in contemporary social 
relations.234 For Houellebecq, pornography represents the utility with which contemporary 
relationships are regarded, leaving little room for emotional attachment. Sex has become 
entertainment and nothing else, as Houellebecq writes: ‘The centuries-old male project, 
perfectly expressed nowadays by pornographic films, that consisted of ridding sexuality of any 
emotional connotation in order to bring it back into the realm of pure entertainment, had 
finally, in this generation, been accomplished.’235 In Houellebecq’s view, sex is a ritualised, non-
productive leisure activity, yet it is apparently the supreme aim of our lives. Futile and empty of 
meaning, it embodies the spiritual abyss that occupies his novels.  
Houellebecq’s treatment of sex consistently presents dead ends and emptiness. He 
portrays the fluidity of contemporary sexuality as the epitome of the single-minded pursuit of 
individual liberties, as individuals no longer feel tied to one another due to the failure of social 
institutions like marriage. Contemporary sexuality is exclusive, illusory, disappointing, and leads 
to greater social isolation and unhappiness, despite being exemplary of personal liberation. The 
affirmation of individuality by Enlightenment humanism aimed for the emancipation of 
thought, ambition, and happiness. For Houellebecq this was eventually reduced to the 
elevation of sex above all else, and with it the enslavement of individuals to a system of 
evaluation, rejection, incommensurable desire, and depression. For Houellebecq, the elevation 
of sex is an attempt to replace the absence of meaning in life, and this attempt is fruitless. 
 
Atomisation and Unhappiness 
The title of Houellebecq’s second novel, Atomised, presents his ideas rather clearly. This 
is the English version of the original French title, Les Particules élémentaires (The elementary 
particles), and he chose the word to summarise his perception that contemporary life is 
isolated and lonely as a result of the disintegration of social bonds.236 He describes a world 
where social units are completely separated because the traditional grouping mechanisms of 
family and religion have lost all relevance and influence. The guiding principles of 
contemporary life do little to unite people, but instead they exacerbate isolation and 
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unhappiness. For Houellebecq, individualism breeds alienation. As Carole Sweeney terms it, 
Houellebecq’s society has undergone an ‘ideological collapse’.237 The support structures of 
tradition have lost their strength— people live in isolation, largely without direction and 
guidance. To use Houellebecq’s metaphor, society has been reduced to the most fundamental 
degree, and individuals are elementary particles deprived of all social bonds and inherent 
purpose. Betul Dilmac states that, ‘at the end of this process of societal and interpersonal 
disintegration… man is seen as being left behind in solitude, as an individual being, a particule 
élémentaire.’238 And as Leonidas Donskis puts it, the reality of Houellebecq’s fiction ‘is the 
individual’s total isolation accompanied by society’s atomization and fragmentation.’239 With 
this emphasis on the destruction of social bonds and unifying ideals Houellebecq demonstrates 
how contemporary life has become characterised by solitude, helplessness, and futility.  
Happiness is impossible for Houellebecq’s characters, and this is usually due to their 
isolation. This is evident in the lives of the dual protagonists of Atomised, Janine’s children 
Bruno and Michel. Slavoj Zizek observes that their stories exhibit the damaging repercussions 
of individualism: ‘all their attempts at the pursuit of happiness, whether through marriage, the 
study of philosophy, or the consumption of pornography, merely lead to loneliness and 
frustration.’240 This loneliness and frustration manifests for Bruno in his pathological sex drive, 
which results in his internment in a mental health facility after he sexually assaults a schoolgirl. 
His frustrated sex addiction eventually leads to institutional isolation. An obsessive biochemist 
and emotional recluse, Michel’s alienation is an innate aspect of his character. He is distant and 
reluctant to pursue romantic relationships, but after some time his childhood friend Annabelle 
manages to secure him in a relationship, realising her longstanding goal of maternity. She is 
diagnosed with terminal uterine cancer shortly after becoming pregnant, and is then forced to 
have an abortion and hysterectomy. Unable to conceive again and facing a painful death, 
Annabelle soon commits suicide. Shortly after, Michel leaves France to pursue his genetic 
research in a remote laboratory in Ireland where he also kills himself. Before leaving, and as he 
scatters Annabelle’s ashes in the garden of her parent’s house, Michel experiences something 
close to true emotion. As Houellebecq writes: ‘He looked at the earth, the sun, the roses; the 
suppleness of the grass. It was incomprehensible… The sky seemed to be streaked with 
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sunlight; he realised that he was crying.’241 Annabel’s fate is brutal, but Michel’s distance only 
permits the faintest acknowledgement of the tragedy. He realises this emotional attachment 
only when scattering her remains, clearly too late to return it. For Michel, happiness is only 
possible in retrospect and through loss. In the lives of both brothers it is possible to see 
Houellebecq’s conception of social atomisation and its affect on personal life.  
Such is the solitude of Houellebecq’s contemporary world that many of his characters 
choose to end their own lives rather than face their own physical decline. Without families or 
spouses, or having become estranged from them, the characters have little to live for once 
their capacity for seeking pleasure is diminished. This is a common theme in Houellebecq’s 
novels, a certain stigmatisation of ageing and disability.242 The physical decline of ageing is 
accelerated for two characters in Atomised. Annabelle commits suicide when she learns that her 
body can no longer support children. Bruno’s partner Christiane makes a similar decision when 
she becomes crippled by necrosis of the vertebrae. Agonised by the prospect of burdening 
Bruno, unable to satisfy him physically, and dreading the physical hardships of her future, she 
decides to commit suicide by throwing herself down the stairs. This is the new model for adult 
life in Houellebecq’s novels, as he states: ‘a time will come when the sum of pleasures that life 
has left to offer is outweighed by the sum of pain… This weighing up of pleasure and pain 
which, sooner or later, everyone is forced to make, leads logically, at a certain age, to suicide.’243 
In Houellebecq’s universe, where temporary physical pleasure is the highest thing in life, an 
inordinate amount of hardship is reason enough to cease one’s own existence. 
Houellebecq returns to this theme in The Map and the Territory (2010) when the father of 
the main character Jed decides to be euthanised after being diagnosed with rectal cancer and 
fitted with an artificial anus.244 The pain and humiliation turns out to be too much for him, and 
he seeks out an organisation in Zurich that provides the service he requires. Upon hearing the 
news that his father had left France for Switzerland, Jed also travels there to intervene. When 
the taxi mistakenly drops Jed off at a neighbouring brothel he has a perturbing realisation. The 
brothel is a large, elaborately decorated establishment with longer opening hours than the 
euthanasia group, but by comparison enjoys far less business. Noting this difference in 
business activity Jed speculates that the market value of death and suffering had surpassed that 
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of sex and pleasure.245 It would appear that the sum of pleasures is dwindling in opposition to 
the sum of pain, and that an increasing number of people are seeking recourse in assisted 
suicide. Houellebecq is using another opportunity to make his point about a civilisation in 
decline, where people would prefer to die than to endure an unpleasurable life. This 
phenomenon is particularly grim when there is an ageing population. 
A key aspect of The Possibility of an Island (2005) is the contradictory manner in which 
the society portrayed regards youth and ageing. The dominant ethos places utmost importance 
on youthful activities, beauty, and sex appeal.246 At the same time it is increasingly saddled with 
an ageing population. This is largely due to a decline in the birth rate, indicating that young 
people are no longer having children. The main character Daniel remarks that once a certain 
level of economic development is reached in any culture it begins to depopulate, as evidenced 
by the appearance of ‘child-free zones’ in recent residential developments.247 He observes that: 
‘for the first time, young, educated people, in a good position on the socio-economic scale, 
declared publicly that they did not want children, that they felt no desire to put up with the 
bother and expense associated with bringing up offspring.’248 Most people prefer to avoid the 
responsibility entailed in caring for children in order to maximise pleasure time. Morrey notes 
this as the central contradiction that Houellebecq’s novel aims to expose—the inherent dead 
end that comes from the collective worship of youth.249 Houellebecq portrays a society that is 
obsessed with youth, yet is populated by older people who are increasingly distressed by their 
inability to live up to the idealisation of youth. It is a central paradox that recalls the paradox of 
the absurd—it is an unwinnable situation. With his observations and predictions about ageing 
Houellebecq further illustrates his opinion that the pursuit of pleasure can make life 
unbearable.  
The abundance of sadness and frustration in Houellebecq’s work reinforces his 
opinion that contemporary life is meaningless, and that this is because something is missing. 
His characters despair because they lack the sense of purpose and meaning that comes from 
enduring emotional and spiritual bonds, or other ephemeral ideas that give life meaning. 
Camus also identified the problematic nature of life without aims. His project with The Myth of 
Sisyphus began with the question of whether it is possible to live without a purpose-giving 
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meaning. For him, answering the question of suicide confirms the first question of philosophy, 
whether life is worth living.250 Houellebecq has similar sentiments, expressed in his third novel 
Platform (2001): ‘The absence of the will to live is, alas, not sufficient to make one want to 
die.’251 With this sentence Houellebecq inverts Camus’s question, emptying it of assertion and 
decisiveness. Rather than posing a question to assess one’s existential values, Houellebecq’s 
statement assumes that the answer is negative, but precludes the radical response of ending 
one’s own life. For him, life is already meaningless, and if it must be lived it is lived reluctantly. 
This is crucially identified in the statement above in its unifying exclamation of ‘alas’.252 Rather 
than a declaration of relief at the preclusion of suicide, Houellebecq’s phrasing conveys despair 
at the ineluctability of living. It expresses a view that is pessimistic, ruling out the possibility of 
happiness and fulfilment, that isolation and unhappiness are definitive aspects of existence.253 
Houellebecq presents a universe where life is painful and meaningless, but his central 
characters generally prevail, trying to find meaning in their lives even though it is futile.  
 
Escaping the Deadlock 
Several of Houellebecq’s novels predict massive social changes in the near future. 
These changes either succeed in alleviating the hardships of contemporary life, or attempt to 
do so. Each of these narratives involves the adoption of some kind of system that involves a 
diminished sense of self and autonomy. Because he believes contemporary problems come 
from the sole pursuit of individual desire, Houellebecq’s solution is to rule it out. His various 
proposals for how this might occur achieve different levels of success. The first can be 
understood as an ambitious but doomed continuation of the humanist project in a cloned, 
perfected human species. The second is the widespread adoption of a relaxed but 
comprehensive version of sharia law, in effect a rejection of Enlightenment values. These 
narratives are like thought experiments where Houellebecq tests out various solutions to his 
social crisis, and in doing so he makes the association between his work and the absurd clearer. 
For Houellebecq, the easiest and most effective way to escape the crisis of contemporary life is 
to submit the intellect to religious observance. 
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Two of Houellebecq’s best-known books, Atomised and The Possibility of an Island, 
feature narrators from a genetically engineered, cloned version of the human species. The 
defining attribute of these new species is their lack of individuality, affect, and desire, and this 
is designed to allow them to lead peaceful, happy lives.254 Houellebecq introduces this idea in 
Atomised, when a new species is created as the eventual result of Michel’s experiments with the 
human genome. In a brief epilogue it is revealed that the narrator is a member of this new 
species, and it quickly summarises the series of events after Djerzinski’s death that led to its 
development.255 Its creators touted this new life form as proof that ‘humanity should be 
honoured to be “the first species in the universe which had developed the conditions for its 
successor.”’256 This pronouncement is prophetic, as the new self-cloning species eventually 
survives the human race, which slowly dwindles away in small populations.257 Key to this rather 
abrupt twist in the novel’s premise is its air of calm and relief. After the tumultuous personal 
lives of the two main characters come to an end, a soothing voice relates a peaceful apocalypse. 
As the narrator observes, ‘It has been interesting to note the meekness, the resignation, 
perhaps even the relief of humans at their own passing away.’258 This relief is afforded by this 
new version of humanity’s capacity to live in harmony and without fear. As the narrator states: 
‘Men consider us to be happy; it is certainly true that we have succeeded in overcoming the 
monstrous egotism, cruelty and anger which they could not; we live very different lives.’259  
Houellebecq returns to this theme in The Possibility of an Island. It is narrated in part by 
the twenty-fourth copy of the central character’s clone, referred to as Daniel24, who is 
replaced halfway through the novel by Daniel25. This version of the reinvention of humanity 
differs in tone and nature to that in Atomised. In this plot a team of microbiologists posing as a 
cult develops the new species. The affluent are able to purchase the right to be reincarnated as 
clones, and thus transition into what they perceive as immortality by committing suicide when 
living is no longer desirable. Again the defining characteristic of these beings is their lack of the 
characteristics of individual consciousness.260 This is engineered into the genetic makeup of 
each clone, and is designed to permit its happiness.  
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Houellebecq’s use of these science fiction plotlines is complex. In Atomised the 
development of a new species is used to propose a possible solution to the problems caused by 
the blind pursuit of personal freedom. Its part in the novel is brief, and it is described as a 
utopia. This narrative seems to articulate his dismissal of humanist values by proposing a 
situation where humanity can only be redeemed by eliminating individuality. Houellebecq 
depicts the greater proportion of future society reaching a tacit agreement that humanity must 
not be sustained, completely negating humanist values of self-improvement. He isolates the 
self-interest that fuels these aims as the very cause for their failure, and thus the solution is to 
remove will from the human species to permit happiness.261 Houellebecq’s intent here might 
be to stipulate that the logical result of humanism is the termination of the species, that it 
subverts itself, as both narratives gesture at this situation.  
Another way to understand Houellebecq’s fictional reinvention of the human species is 
that is represents an evolution in the humanist project, a perfection of humanity as engineered 
by humans themselves. Houellebecq seems to anticipate this reading because when he revisits 
the theme in The Possibility of an Island, his vision of the future is far more dystopic. The novel 
ends with the clones gradually leaving their compounds, which cancels their replication and 
discontinues their species. Daniel25 senses his own lack of affect after reading the embittered 
but passionate life story of his human ancestor, cementing his suspicions that something is 
missing in his nature. He leaves to find what is absent but only encounters the savage remnants 
of human civilisation. With this narrative Houellebecq seems to suggest that, even if the 
aspirations of humanism were carried to these kinds of extremes, they would still subvert 
themselves in the end. 
Douglas Morrey asserts that all aspects of Houellebecq’s oeuvre indicate his 
commitment to a broader definition of the posthuman.262 Morrey’s use of this term aims to 
highlight Houellebecq’s rejection of humanism. He argues that the novelist’s focus on the most 
barbaric aspects of contemporary society, coupled with his tendency for extended asides of 
sociological, historical and economic analysis, plays down the significance of the individual 
protagonists and emphasises the animalistic side of human behaviour.263 This is evident in the 
epilogue of Atomised where the personal struggles of the central characters are bookended by a 
depiction of the apocalypse, and also in the portrayal of brutally reductive sexual economics. 
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Thus Morrey attributes to Houellebecq a sensitivity to ideas of the posthuman that play down 
the exceptionality of human intelligence and self-determination, a central assertion of ‘the old 
humanism’ still persistent in many fields of discourse.264 He thus introduces a reading of 
Houellebecq’s work that can be aligned with N. Katherine Hayles’ notion of humans as 
‘information processing machines’ akin to computer systems, opposing the humanist assertion 
of individual autonomy and the belief that rational thought is exclusive to humanity.265  
Houellebecq’s ideas also invite comparison with what Jean-Marie Schaeffer has called ‘the end 
of the human exception’.266 This is the acknowledgement that humans are the result of 
evolution and as such are not separable from other life forms and systems, opposing humanist 
notions of autonomy.267 While logical, this idea undermines so many aspects of human culture 
and practices that its true realisation would be devastating, rendering animals the same rights as 
humans (thus destabilising culture and industry) or worse, allowing humans to be treated as 
animals. But as Cary Wolfe notes, this view allows for a more modest view of humanity 
alongside other species. For him, posthumanism means ‘an increase in the vigilance, 
responsibility, and humility that accompany living in a world so newly, and differently, 
inhabited.’268 This conception of posthumanism plays down the significance and exceptionality 
of human intelligence and liberty, encourages modesty and acknowledges the need for a 
renewed sense of duty. By aligning Houellebecq’s work with posthuman and posthumanist 
discourse Morrey confirms the author’s rejection of humanist ideals, however the conclusions 
of these discourses are problematic. 
Houellebecq’s proposition of a cloned society echoes Camus’s discussion of the 
implications of the absurd, and reaches similar conclusions. In The Myth of Sisyphus, Camus 
raises the possibility of suicide as a response to the meaninglessness of life. For him the absurd 
is an unsolvable conflict between human reason and the world. He argues that while this 
conflict is ‘settled’ by suicide, it is not solved, because killing oneself negates one side of the 
conflict. It is an annulment rather than a solution. Houellebecq’s science fiction narrative is a 
similar solution to his social crisis. He identifies that personal alienation is due to the 
selfishness allowed by ideals of individual freedom and gratification, which have been 
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exacerbated by the market. He proposes a solution to this, and the many other problems that 
are caused by it, by the elimination of individuality. Not only does Houellebecq propose the 
self-destruction of the human race, but also the removal of human attributes in its successor—
his solution to human problems is the end of humanity. Like Camus’s discussion of suicide, 
Houellebecq’s solution eliminates one of the terms of the conflict. Camus was not satisfied 
with suicide because his aim was to argue the possibility of living with meaninglessness. 
Houellebecq also rejects his solution with its failure in The Possibility of an Island. He seems 
similarly humanist, as ultimately his fictional proposition of the end of humanity becomes 
derailed. Like Camus, Houellebecq is not satisfied with ending human life to escape its 
problems. But he is interested in escape. His characters consistently seek it, usually in sex, but 
this time in suicide disguised as immortality.269 In his more recent work this escape is religion. 
In Submission Houellebecq maintains his critique of contemporary society, but poses a 
different escape from its problems. Despite Islam’s centrality to the plot it is not the novel’s 
subject. Rather, it is the relief with which the Western population of the not-too-distant future 
turn to religion in order to make their lives easier and more peaceful. Its subject is the failure 
of individualism, and the social value of a decreased sense of self-interest. Houellebecq’s 
protagonist is again depressed and lonely. François is a mid-level literature professor whose 
occasional romantic engagements with students are brief, but who cannot return the genuine 
affections of his casual girlfriend. He sees prostitutes, but this only adds to his loneliness. He 
views contemporary society as shallow and pretentious, but he can’t explain why. As Mark Lilla 
states, ‘François is shipwrecked in the present. He doesn’t understand why his students are so 
eager to get rich, or why journalists and politicians are so hollow, or why everyone, like him, is 
so alone.’270 Meanwhile the presidential election is imminent, and the conservatives have the 
upper hand. The three other major parties then form a coalition in order to gain the majority 
and nominate the leader of the new, moderate, and fairly popular Muslim Brotherhood as their 
candidate. They win, and France elects its first Islamic president.  
The parties divide up their government portfolios and the Muslim Brotherhood 
decides only to manage education. Soon all teachers, including François, are forced into 
premature retirement on full pensions. Muslim teachers replace them but François is 
encouraged to return on the condition that he converts to Islam. He eventually does this with 
some reluctance, and an unsuccessful attempt to engage with Christianity, but his reasons have 
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little to do with faith in Allah. In this version of Islam, men are permitted multiple wives for 
sex, procreation, and affection, and the wives assume each of these successive roles as they 
age. They have many children who are well nurtured and have lots of siblings for company. 
The men are always sexually satisfied, the women never fear abandonment, and everyone feels 
loved.271 François is wooed by this prospect, partly for the possibility of choosing his wives, 
but mostly because he is lonely, estranged from his parents, and fantasises over what Lilla 
describes as a ‘family romance’.272 This new social model is established with the help of 
attractive family subsidies that entice women to leave the workplace and have children. The 
new job vacancies that result cause a decline in unemployment, and youth crime declines due 
to improving socio-economic conditions and the discipline of Islamic education. France’s 
social problems practically disappear overnight. With Submission Houellebecq depicts religion as 
the panacea for all the crises of contemporary existence that were introduced by humanism, 
and exacerbated by individualism and capitalism.  
In Submission Houellebecq directly addresses a thread that runs through much of his 
work. As evidenced by his characters’ desperate attempts at escape and fulfilment, there is a 
persistent sense that something is missing in contemporary society.273 All of his protagonists 
are lonely and isolated, but they occasionally fall in love. Due to misfortune or personal fault 
this experience is always temporary, fragile, and often traumatic, but nevertheless Houellebecq 
treats love as transformational. It elevates his characters from misanthropic cynicism to a state 
of almost spiritual transcendence.274 Douglas Morrey points out that this tendency is in keeping 
with an ancient Judeo-Christian tradition that celebrates selfless love, and the salvation that it 
brings.275 Love is endowed with redemptive capacities because it negates self-importance. In 
his novels, this is described in unlikely contexts. In Platform Michel finds love in the sordid 
world of sex tourism, in Atomised Bruno and Christiane celebrate their love with group sex in 
BDSM clubs. As Nelly Kaprielian points out, this juxtaposition is intended to reveal what is 
missing in contemporary life.276 Submission therefore continues this trend in Houellebecq’s work 
where happiness can only be found in self-denial.  
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Despite Houellebecq’s repeated emphasis on the benefits of self-abnegation, his work 
does not emphasise a specific need to return to religion. He admires faith for its capacity to 
give life a sense of meaning, but is nevertheless unable to commit to it. In a series of letters 
published in Public Enemies (2008) he states his repeated efforts to engage with Christianity. 
While living in Paris he would frequent mass on Sundays and become entranced by the ritual. 
As he states, ‘certain words entered me, and I received them into my heart. And for five to ten 
minutes every Sunday, I believed in God’.277 Although these experiences were brief and 
infrequent, they inspired in him the desire to be baptised, but when he attempted to follow the 
preparations for the ritual he soon lost interest.278 Nevertheless Houellebecq notes how 
religious faith unites, giving individuals and groups a formidable sense of purpose. As he 
writes, ‘it is a principle of a spiritual nature, the most difficult thing in the world to defeat 
(something that is perhaps, strictly speaking, invincible).’279 The absurd means the 
acknowledgement that life lacks this purpose, and it is the identification of this lack that 
inspires Houellebecq’s pessimistic view of contemporary life. For him the absence of belief 
leads directly to despair. He states that ‘a world with no God, with no spirituality, with nothing, 
is enough to make anyone freak out completely’.280 Houellebecq presents a world in crisis, and 
this is the result of the inability to replace religious meaning with a suitable alternative. He 
acknowledges that this view cannot be supported empirically, but that it is central to his 
understanding of contemporary society. He writes: ‘Obviously, it is impossible for me to 
establish that for society to cut itself off from the religious is tantamount to suicide; it is simply 
an intuition, but a persistent intuition.’281 It is this belief that leads Houellebecq to the idea that 
a return to the religious is inevitable.282 This notion undoubtedly led him to write Submission, a 
novel that predicts this return, but also demonstrates its social and personal benefits. Even 
though Submission summarises his attitudes quite succinctly, it is important to remember that is 
a satire, like most of his works.283 While it is clear that Houellebecq in some ways values the 
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meaning that religion provides to individual existence, it is his reluctance to commit to faith 
that cements the relationship between his ideas and the absurd. 
Houellebecq’s desire, but ultimate inability, to convert to Christianity is crucial to how 
his thought relates to the absurd. In Submission François specialises in the work of J.K. 
Huysmans, a novelist who converted to Catholicism in mid-life. Houellebecq originally 
intended the novel’s protagonist to follow a similar course. First titled La Conversion, it was to 
follow a man’s struggle to embrace Catholicism as an alternative to the many disappointments 
of atheistic life.284 This intended plot mirrors both Huysmans’ and his own experiences, but the 
autobiographical quality of the novel is retained even after Houellebecq opted to base it 
around Islam instead of Christianity. François shares a similar desire for the spiritual, and even 
experiences a strange sensation that he confuses with faith in front of a historic Christian 
statue—much like Houellebecq’s trips to Sunday mass. He fails when he tries to repeat the 
occurrence, and eventually attributes the experience to hypoglycaemia. François’s eventual 
conversion to Islam does not come from divine intuition, but rather by deduction. His 
decision is based purely on his loneliness, his observations of the social benefits of religion, 
and also the appeal of sexual gratification without competition. The situation seems to be 
similar for Houellebecq. While his work consistently decries the social implications of the 
decline of religion, he is reluctant to embrace it himself. In Public Enemies (2008) he calls 
himself an atheist, but his choice of words is crucial: ‘The only thing is, the only problem is, I 
still don’t believe in God.’285 Houellebecq’s problem is that he knows the value of religion in 
giving life purpose, but he also knows that faith is irrational, and implausible in the 
contemporary world. He knows the fallacy of faith, but he is drawn to it as a possible 
alternative to the existential despair of a purely rational approach to life. 
This longing for but inability to accept religion links all three discussions of the absurd. 
Kierkegaard’s entire oeuvre is devoted to being able to accept the assertions of dogma. His 
conviction is fuelled by doubt, and this doubt implies the absurd. Camus attempts to establish 
a purpose of life to replace that of an abandoned religion. His absurd is the longing for 
meaning in faithless existence. He deemed a return to religion as philosophical suicide, the 
submission of the intellect to belief in the impossible. Houellebecq’s absurd is similar to 
Camus’s, but it comes much later, once the belief in human capacity has been exhausted. He is 
attracted to religion, but solely for pragmatic reasons. His work identifies the need for faith, 
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but not divinity or transcendence. Rather, it is the sense of relief that can be found in the 
surrender of autonomy and the independence of the intellect, the ease of life when its path is 
set rather than stumbled upon. This surrender of the intellect is suggested by his change of title 
from La Conversion to Submission, which removes any association with the sacred. In 
Houellebecq’s work God is forever absent and mute.286 Houellebecq’s return to religion is not 
the return of God, it is the return of humility and cooperation, and the meaning that it creates. 
It is the wish for community in an atomised society. Thus Houellebecq’s absurd is the same as 
Camus’s and Kierkegaard’s, because it involves the acknowledgement that it is impossible to 
determine our purpose ourselves. 
The absurd comes from having values that contradict one’s setting, and while this is 
certainly the case for Houellebecq, his values seem to have a more inherent paradox. For all of 
Houellebecq’s vitriol against the repercussions of liberal humanism, his nostalgia for a lost 
meaning in life is essentially humanistic.287 His augmentation and annihilation of the human 
species in some of his texts, and the turn to religion in others, is less focused on transcendence 
and more on the alleviation of human suffering. Morrey also notes Houellebecq’s 
contradictory humanism by pointing out that perhaps his frequent turns to religion betray the 
difficulty in abandoning the notion of human exceptionality, which is rooted in Christian 
thinking.288 But it is doubtful that this is what truly motivates Houellebecq’s tentative 
endorsement of religion since he, as Morrey also notes, seems to place the most value on the 
aspects of faith that encourage self-abnegation.289 Houellebecq turns to religion as a kind of 
antidote to the selfish consumerism that he thinks is destroying society. This crystallises in 
Submission but Morrey notes the same ideas in The Possibility of an Island, published nearly a 
decade beforehand. As he states: 
  
One of the most powerful insights of La Possibilité d’une île is the implication that the 
kind of social changes required in order to avert the demographic and climatological 
emergencies that could prove destructive to our species over the coming century 
cannot be brought about through liberal democracy since it is liberal democracy that 
has shaped the behaviours responsible for these threatening calamities… If we are to 
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avoid the kind of collective suicide that Houellebecq repeatedly envisions in his fiction, 
it may well require a solution with the organisational structure and the force of 
conviction of a religion.290 
 
Houellebecq does not call for a return to religion because he thinks that contemporary society 
needs to embrace the spiritual, nor is his nostalgia conservative. Rather, he turns to religion out 
of desperation, because it provides a more or less successful model for communal living.  
Of the many labels that Houellebecq has received, none do justice to the entirety of his 
output and the multiple positions he takes within it. Among other things, he is accused of 
being a cynic, nihilist, misanthrope, reactionary, pessimist, misogynist, racist, and 
homophobe.291 These labels try to pin down a discrete agenda relating to a single prejudice or 
pathology, ignoring the fact that when considered in their entirety Houellebecq’s criticisms 
target everyone—and are motivated by a will for all to be better off. A more fitting description 
comes from someone who has spent a lot of time with him. Louise Wardle directed and 
produced a documentary series on Houellebecq early in his career, and offers this insight to his 
personality and the motivation of his work. As she states: ‘He is a very sweet, tiny, angry 
man—and he’s horrified by what he sees but can’t stop seeing it, carries on watching, and 
writes it down.’292 The quality of this description has to do with its simplicity. Rather than 
trying to classify Houellebecq’s position, Wardle instead describes his condition. Houellebecq’s 
work depicts a deadlock of contemporary subjectivity that is very similar to the absurd, and he 
amplifies it to make it more apparent—and if it seems horrible, that is because he is horrified 
by it. Simply put, his work depicts the world as he sees it.  
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Chapter Four: Bruce Nauman  
 
 Bruce Nauman does not just make art about the absurd, he also takes an absurdist 
approach to making art. There is a pervasive sense of philosophical uncertainty and frustration 
in his work, but he also integrates this attitude with his process. Nauman’s approach is solitary, 
he does not identify with any school or movement but prefers a rigorously independent 
methodology. He believes that art has no extant purpose, and that in order to work he must 
continually define that purpose—an approach that involves considerable struggle. As a result, 
he often records his obsessive and pointless activity in the studio and presents it as the proof 
of his process as well as the final work. These works both symbolise and document the 
frustrations of the absurd, however their motivation is more immediate. Nauman’s frustration 
is not with the lack of meaning in human life, but the difficulty in understanding our role and 
agency in it. His work articulates his struggle to define the nature of art and the role of the 
artist after modernism, and in later work, to make sense of the behaviours that shape human 
existence. Due to these similarities, many commentators have analysed the relationship 
between his work and the absurd—its emphasis on repetition, confusion, and anonymity, as 
well as its affinity with the work of Samuel Beckett. This chapter examines this relationship 
and these analyses to better understand how Nauman’s work engages the absurd. Its purpose is 
to illuminate a further example of the relevance of the absurd to both art and the human 
experience beyond modernism. 
 
Acting in Isolation  
Because he takes his isolation and uncertainty as a starting point, Nauman’s work 
operates upon a principle of autonomy.293 There is little if any consistency to his style, and as a 
result it cannot be ascribed to a distinct movement.294 Nauman’s art does not share the 
straightforwardness of Pop Art, or the ardour of Abstract Expressionism, yet he developed his 
practice in a period dominated by them.295 For a young artist to display such aesthetic 
ambivalence is fitting given that the time was characterised by doubts around the purpose of 
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art and the role of artists.296 These doubts were coupled with Nauman’s own sense of 
displacement caused by his move from Wisconsin to Los Angeles, which seems to have 
affected his perception of the nature of art. During his master’s studies at the University of 
California, Nauman used materials such as un-sanded fibreglass and burlap coated in latex to 
construct indistinct forms that would often be heaped into a corner or strewn along the floor 
of a studio or gallery.297 Noting this ambivalence to standard materials and modes of 
presentation, Peter Plagens evocatively describes Nauman’s attitude to art as ‘mud on top of 
quicksand, hovering over an abyss’.298 It is also important that this period had its share of 
divisive sentiments—on one hand there was optimism at the development of first-hand space 
exploration, and on the other the fear of possible nuclear annihilation.299 From the outset 
Nauman’s art practice was shadowed by uncertainty and isolation. 
Since Nauman’s early career seemed to be characterised by doubt, it seems fitting that 
doubt would come to inform much of his work. As he admits without irony, the single 
motivating question of his practice is ‘why anybody continues to make art’.300 This frank line 
resonates with Camus’s opening to The Myth of Sisyphus, because it is just as arresting. Camus’s 
question asks us to define what makes life worth living besides false hope, and Nauman’s asks 
why he bothers to do something that has no ostensible purpose or definition. The lack of an 
inherent objective to life and art begs the question as to what one should do. Nauman’s answer 
occurred to him one day in his studio, when he could not decide what to do next. As he states: 
‘If I was an artist and I was in the studio, then whatever I was doing in the studio must be 
art… At this point art became more of an activity and less of a product.’301 This declaration has 
become axiomatic, both for Nauman and for the critical reception of his work, but it is 
important not to take it out of context. This motivating principle occurred to him shortly after 
leaving graduate school, while alone in his newly rented studio, experiencing sudden isolation 
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from the incubator of the educational institution.302 He had realised that there was no order for 
him to follow, and that if he reduced the artistic act to its core, it became, simply, the artist 
acting. Nauman had come to the rather existential realisation that his ability to make art was 
only contingent on himself being an artist.  
Nauman’s ideas about the role of the artist resulted in an important series of works 
between 1967 and 1968. He noticed that most of his studio time was spent pacing around 
drinking coffee, so he decided to film it since that was what he, the artist, was doing.303 
Choosing his own body as a medium came from the kind of plain logic and simplicity of 
means that have come to define Nauman’s work. Initially, he could not afford the materials to 
make sculptures and paintings, which forced him to question his motives. As he states: ‘There 
was nothing in the studio because I didn’t have much money for materials. So I was forced to 
examine myself and what I was doing there.’304 For Nauman, having art materials in his studio 
determined what art he would make. If he had paints and canvas then he would have to make 
paintings, but he had no desire to make art in a form that could be anticipated.305 If he was to 
operate by the assumption that his role and his location designated his output, then he should 
have as close to an empty room as possible. He then decided to rid the space of superfluous 
materials, leaving nothing but his own body in the space, and as a result the subject and form 
of his work came to be himself. Freed from the limitations of standard materials, he was able 
to focus on his own ontic materiality.306  
These discoveries formed the basis for numerous performance works that Nauman 
recorded on film and later video. Works such as Walking in an Exaggerated Manner Around the 
Perimeter of a Square, Playing A Note on the Violin While I Walk Around the Studio, and Bouncing Two 
Balls Between the Floor and Ceiling with Changing Rhythms (all 1967-68) (fig. 1-3) feature the artist 
engaging in the eponymous tasks for the duration of the film. Nauman’s arbitrary selection of 
these tasks and presentation of them as works of art at first seems frivolous, but his dedication 
to their performance is total.307 To him this activity is vital and meaningful, and this urgency 
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comes from the conditions that led to his decision to record it. At a loss as to what to do, 
unable to identify with the dominant artistic tendencies of the time, and materially limited due 
to impecunity, Nauman found himself pacing around his studio trying to determine the nature 
of art and his role as an artist. These are gestures of tedium, boredom, and frustration—the 
procrastinations of someone who cannot decide what to do next. Having reached the 
conclusion that his activity as an artist in the studio must therefore be art, he realised that his 
aimless pacing was also art. Thus, Nauman decided that the only way to act in a futile situation 
was to record it.  
 
Similar conditions led me to make an early series of performance video works. I felt insignificant and 
frustrated by the status quo, but also hypocritical because I could not help but be part of it. I wanted to act but 
felt that I could not, so I decided to replicate my situation in short allegorical video loops. The first of these is 
Man with Umbrella (2005) (fig. 10) in which I stand waist deep in a pool of water, holding an umbrella to 
ward off the falling rain. The umbrella, a signifier of protection from water, has become useless because my body 
is already immersed in water. But I stand there regardless, stuck in the situation. A feeling of futility stimulated 
me to present futility in my art. In a recent work, What Have You (2015) (fig. 11), I am pictured in the 
centre of a brightly coloured background, twiddling my thumbs. The action is exaggerated by a whirling sound 
effect and changing camera angles that crop in on the hands. With each edit the background colour changes and 
the whirling sound increases in volume, creating excitement and a sense of expectation that is disappointed by the 
activity. 
 
Nauman’s decision to work outside conventional definitions of artistic labour meant 
his practice would involve considerable effort. As he explains of his early career: ‘When I was 
at art school, I thought art was something I would learn how to do, and then I would just do it. 
At a certain point I realised that it wasn’t going to work like that. Basically, I would have to 
start over every day and figure out what art was going to be.’308 Nauman’s method required 
him to begin afresh with each work, to abandon the progress, distinctions, and definitions 
established with great effort by his predecessors, and to an extent, his previous works.309 It is a 
process that Plagens describes as ex nihilo, because for Nauman every work comes from 
nothing.310 Although this phrasing seems misleading given that Nauman often uses the same 
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materials and subject matter in different works, Plagens’ choice of words emphasises his 
autonomous approach.311 In Nauman’s view art is not a skill that can be learned or an idea that 
can be taught. Rather, art is a solitary and arduous activity based on endless questioning. 
It is possible to see similarities between Nauman’s process and the way that key writers 
suggest we deal with the absurd. His emphasis on constant struggle is similar to Kierkegaard’s 
idea that faith is a continual struggle to surmount the absurd. Camus’s absurdist worldview also 
emphasises constant effort and autonomy, the need to embrace life’s lack of inherent purpose 
in order to define our own meaning. He asserts that this attitude is necessary in order to thrive 
in a meaningless existence. Nauman’s view of himself as a solitary agent can also be likened 
with Samuel Beckett’s portrayal of life in his plays and novels, particularly his inclination to 
describe it as isolating and perplexing. As Plagens notes, their works share the ‘recognition that 
you are born alone, die alone, and in between are absolutely mystified by the idea of being 
there.’312 Nauman’s idea of art and approach to making it are very similar to the attitudes to life 
of significant writers on the absurd. Thus, his solitary struggle to define himself and his work 
every day in the studio can be understood as his version of absurdist existence.313  
 
Pointless Activity 
Nauman’s early performance videos intentionally frustrate the viewer’s expectations of 
metaphor and narrative.314 His activities seem arbitrarily chosen, and are done for no apparent 
reason. The videos have no other purpose than to document his activity, leading nowhere 
except to bring him to a state of gradual fatigue, but he never stops or collapses. Before any 
outcome is reached, the footage cuts out and promptly restarts. Nauman has performed for 
the entire duration of the media, either ten minutes for film or sixty if it is a video. This formal 
decision makes his action appear endless: it resumes and continues and thus denies a possible 
narrative resolution or satisfying outcome. As he states, his prolonged engagement in pointless 
tasks is designed to elicit tension in the viewer: ‘My problem was to make tapes that go on and 
on, with no beginning or end. I wanted the tension of waiting for something to happen, and 
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then you should get drawn into the rhythm of the thing.’315 Nauman wants to create a sense of 
expectation, but he also wants this expectation to become dulled by familiarity. In effect, he 
prepares the viewer for nothing to happen. The sustained and rhythmic action of these 
performances gradually allows for the possibility of error and exhaustion, but little more is 
offered by way of a climax or conclusion.316 Key to the work is the fact that no result is 
achieved. The viewer endures this repetitive fruitless action, slowly becoming accustomed to, 
or entranced by, its cyclical nature because little alternative is offered—one has the choice to 
endure or to leave, and nothing else. In a sense, recording these actions has a similar function 
to the objects in a vanitas painting, reminding the viewer that ultimately nothing is of 
consequence. 
Not only do Nauman’s videos force the viewer to engage in an extended performance 
that does not evolve into anything else, they also feature elaborate but useless actions. The 
works almost exclusively feature the artist expending undue energy on tasks of questionable 
utility, including a laboriously slow and intricate style of walking a course that ends where he 
began.317 Walking in an Exaggerated Manner Around the Perimeter of a Square (fig. 1) gets him 
nowhere, nevertheless his actions are intense and deliberate. For Nauman, this pointless 
exertion is important to the work, as he states: ‘It’s a tedious complicated process to gain even 
a yard.’318 It is not the utility of his action that is important; all that interests Nauman is the fact 
that it is being performed. The tedium of his task reflects the anxiety and boredom that led 
him to perform it. These actions have no meaning other than the fact that they are, due to his 
role and location, art. His tasks are at once cut off from their usual purpose and assigned 
another—in this sense they exist in a void.  
Nauman’s interest in pointless activity continues his work’s relationship with the 
absurd, if not directly, through the work of Samuel Beckett. In an interview with Jane 
Livingston in 1972 he cites a well-known and laboriously descriptive passage from Beckett’s 
Molloy (1951), where the protagonist exchanges stones between the pockets of his overcoat and 
his mouth in a complicated pattern.319 Nauman’s appreciation of this activity is its superfluity, 
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as he states: ‘It’s elaborate without any point.’320 This is also Beckett’s intent, as he frequently 
immerses the reader in repetitive and uncomfortable sequences of pointless acts.321 These 
moments of immersion in pointless activity can be interpreted as metaphors for absurdity. If 
life is meaningless then everything we do is pointless, and Nauman and Beckett repeat this 
through pointless activity in their art. According to one of the most authoritative writers on the 
subject, Martin Esslin, the tendency to turn philosophical ideas into images is characteristic of 
the theatre of the absurd. Instead of presenting the concept of the absurd in the form of a 
lucid and reasonable argument, dramatists like Beckett prefer to recreate absurdity in the form 
and content of their plays. In Esslin’s words, ‘the Theatre of the Absurd has renounced 
arguing about the absurdity of the human condition; it merely presents it in being—that is, in 
terms of concrete stage images.’322 If Beckett’s presentation of superfluous and useless activity 
can be seen to mimic the conditions of the absurd, then Nauman’s emulation of this activity 
does so as well.  
It is worth noting the emphasis that Beckett and Nauman place on these pointless 
actions. In Molloy, the protagonist obsesses over the different patterns by which he could 
transfer the stones between his pockets in order to suck each of the sixteen stones in 
succession. When he develops a new pattern that achieves this he describes the revelation as 
resounding like a passage of Isiah or Jeremiah.323 For Molloy, the pointless and pedantic task is 
of almost religious significance. It seems that Beckett’s character regards the most superfluous 
things as worthy of obsessing over since everything is meaningless. In his earlier novel Murphy 
(1938), the hero obsesses over the possible sequences by which he can eat the five assorted 
biscuits that he has for lunch. He eventually calculates that if he does not eat his favourite kind 
last, then the number of sequences multiplies from twenty-four to a hundred and twenty. 
Murphy is so overwhelmed by this possibility that he falls to the ground, unable to eat until he 
can learn to overcome his preference for one particular biscuit.324 Beckett’s hero is obsessed 
with trivialities, attaching a vital importance to matters that would seem insignificant to most. 
Similar reasoning applies to the intent with which Nauman performs his pointless tasks in the 
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studio. If art is only the act of the artist, then even the most pointless acts are important, 
worthy of close examination.   
 
In another work from 2015, Something from Nothing (fig. 12), I perform a rhythmic routine of 
finger clicking and clapping that mimics the finale to Rossini’s William Tell Overture. An enduring piece of 
music and subject to frequent pastiche in popular culture, it suggests movement, agency, and purpose (most 
commonly that of the cavalry). The action occurred to me when I was waiting for a bus and realised that I 
regularly did it to fill time. Like What Have You (fig. 11), of the same series, I aimed to make it as exciting 
as possible by using multiple camera angles and brightly coloured backgrounds. These alternate with each edit, 
cut to syncopate with the clicked beat. The effect of the video is mesmerising, yet it depicts nothing more than a 
gesture of boredom. This work is similar to Nauman’s because it emphasises complicated yet pointless physical 
actions, although it differs in that its aim is not the viewer’s initial discomfort but instead their immediate 
entertainment. 
 
Many commentators link the work of Nauman and Beckett, and quite a few of these 
focus on their common representations of pointless activity. Beckett is explicitly mentioned in 
the title of Nauman’s 1968 performance video Slow Angle Walk (Beckett Walk) (fig. 4), a work 
where he paces around his studio in an extremely complicated, slow, and deliberate manner. 
Constance Lewallen notes that Nauman based the work on passages in Beckett’s writing that 
detail tedious, repetitive, and apparently pointless gestures.325 For example, in Act II of Waiting 
for Godot (1953), Vladimir, Estragon, and Lucky exchange hats in an elaborate and lengthy 
sequence of actions.326 Neal Benezra asserts that Nauman’s reference to Molloy is proof that 
Beckett’s work influenced him, and that this is particularly evident in his obsessive actions.327 
When explaining why this behaviour interests him, Nauman voices a concern that is shared by 
both Beckett and Camus: ‘They’re all human activities, no matter how limited, strange, or 
pointless, they’re worthy of being examined carefully.’328 In Nauman’s view, the fact that an act 
is pointless does not exclude it from being explored in works of art, but quite the opposite. 
Like Beckett, his choice of pointless actions is quite deliberate because they exemplify his 
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condition and his activity. What seems worthless and meaningless is actually a scrupulous 
examination of his existence.329  
 
Repetition 
 Perhaps due to its metaphoric potential, the concept of repetition has a strong 
theoretical lineage. Nietzsche’s concept of eternal recurrence describes the possibility that all 
time repeats indefinitely, and he uses it throughout his authorship to discuss different attitudes 
to life—whether this repetition would be conceived as a ‘curse’ or a ‘blessing’.330 Kierkegaard 
uses repetition to emphasise that the most pleasurable experiences in life are never planned. 
Any attempt to repeat such an experience ensures it will never live up to one’s expectations, 
precisely because they expect it to. For Kierkegaard in Either/Or, Don Juan is the embodiment 
of this irony. Don Juan is afraid that repeating the act of love with the same woman will 
become boring, so he continually seeks new women to love. However Kierkegaard asserts that 
Don Juan’s activity is still repetitious because he is always seeking new women, again and 
again.331 What these uses of repetition have in common is the sense of entrapment that it 
creates, making a condition that stymies any ethical progression. As such, it is fitting that 
repetition is also a compelling means by which absurdity is conveyed in literature and art.  
As with the interminable and arduous repetition that Sisyphus has to endure, and the 
centrality of this frustration to Camus’s ideas, Nauman’s works feature him and his performers 
trapped in endless loops of pointless activity. His studio works like Slow Angle Walk (fig. 4) 
create this sense of entrapment through repetition.332 Nauman walks around and around his 
studio while repeating the awkward gait. His intention is not advancement but rather the 
performance of the act itself. Schaffner points out that ‘what keeps time throughout these 
prolonged performances is repetition. The opposite of progress, repetition literally keeps time 
from passing. One is stuck in the moment.’333 Movement and progression are denied by 
repetition, and the progression of time is delayed, creating a tension that is never resolved.334  
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Nauman’s self-enforced activities create a sense of entrapment, an effect that is also 
achieved by Beckett’s repetitious plots and dialogues.335 For example, the repetition of 
anticipation and disappointment in Waiting for Godot is a major reason why it the play seems to 
represent the absurd. The two acts are two sequential days in which almost identical events 
take place. This repetition dulls narrative progression, making the characters seem stuck in 
their situation.336 When the second act begins the audience expects new progress in the story, 
but when the events of the first act seem to repeat this expectation is frustrated.337 This 
repetition is acknowledged in the text, which opens the second act with the description, ‘next 
day. Same time. Same place…’ The audience’s frustration is also echoed in the first line of 
dialogue, when Vladimir acknowledges Estragon with a curt ‘you again!’338 Their situation has 
not changed and it continues until the end, when nothing happens—the play is a non-event.339 
Vladimir and Estragon keep their appointment with Godot, who never arrives. The play relates 
an unfulfilled promise that repeats, and as such the audience is presented with a series of 
repetitious events that lead nowhere. In Nauman’s works, the beginning and end of the 
recording do not imply a beginning or end to his activity, nor any kind of resolution. Similarly, 
in Waiting for Godot the beginning and end of the act does not signal a beginning or end to the 
situation, but repeat to create a suspended, irresolvable state.340 This sense of permanent 
restriction is characteristic of Beckett’s work, and adds much to its resonance with the absurd. 
His final line in The Unnameable (1953) summarises this condition well: ‘I can’t go on, I’ll go 
on.’341 
Nauman’s use of repetition perhaps climaxes with his 1987 installation, Clown Torture 
(fig. 5). This is a six-channel video installation consisting of sixty-minute videotapes, with all 
bar one featuring the same three video reels split up to fulfil the duration.342 The videos all 
feature clowns engaging in different tasks: one recites a repetitious limerick, one enacts a 
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childish tantrum by jumping on the spot yelling ‘No! No! No!’, one pretends to be antagonised 
by having his feet tickled, one sits on a toilet, one struggles to hold a fish bowl against the 
ceiling with a broomstick, and one walks through a doorway causing a bucket of water perched 
above it to douse him. According to the installation’s specifications all are to be played at once, 
making the work visually and aurally chaotic. Nauman’s decision to use clowns seems largely 
based on their anonymity, allowing the viewer to focus on their tasks rather than the actors 
performing them.343 Each clown repeats its designated task until the video loops, and then 
begins again as the video resumes on a different screen. Again Nauman employs repetition to 
create a sense of the clown’s confinement.344 As Peter Schjedahl points out, the clowns are 
trapped in no-win situations: ‘These clowns are telling the same circular stories, getting bopped 
by the same water bucket, and monotonously screaming “no! no! no!” as you read this. They 
do so for eternity.’345 They are caught in repetition, their pointless action made eternal by the 
cycle of the video loop. 
 
In my early performance vignettes (fig. 10, 14) I employ an editing technique in order to make the 
performed action seem to last forever, denying the outcome of the performed task. To achieve this effect a single 
video clip is arranged in a video editor to first play forward and then repeat, but in reverse. By playing the second 
identical clip in reverse, the action recorded in it is returned to the first frame, making the sequence a perfect 
loop. These two clips are then duplicated multiple times so that the originally small amount of footage lasts 
hours. In recent videos (fig. 11, 12), I use multiple camera angles to achieve a similar effect. Three cameras 
record the same action at the same time, and the footage is edited so that each camera angle is used in sequence, 
thus repeating the same action from three different angles. Although it is the same footage seen in each angle, it 
seems new because the angle changes, and makes the pointless activity featured in the videos seem to last forever. 
Like Nauman and Beckett, my intention is also to emphasise a lack of progress, to frustrate the viewer’s 
expectation of narrative, and to encourage a sense of the performer’s entrapment.   
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Several writers make strong allusions to the purgatory-like feeling of absurdity when 
discussing the repetitious nature of Clown Torture (fig. 5). Storr observes that the clowns enact 
‘scenes of absurd powerlessness, constipated indecisiveness, and hopelessly repetitious 
confusion.’346 His use of the term alludes to the work’s Sisyphean quality—unable to escape 
the situation, the clowns must repeat their acts forever. Robert Morgan also comments on this 
sense of entrapment, and offers the reading that it functions as a metaphor for the absurd: ‘the 
clown represents internal frustration as he is caught between conflict and resolution or, in 
more general terms, between experience and his inability to understand.’347 Here Morgan likens 
the clown’s situation to the state of absurdity. He identifies this as a state of suspended 
narrative, the tension between conflict and resolution.348 Arthur Danto also analyses Clown 
Torture in a way that suggests the absurd. He remarks that the clowns’ repetitious ordeals can 
be likened to human life. Their failure and confusion is never resolved, but repeated and 
suspended: ‘If they allegorise the human condition, as can be argued, human life is the same 
thing over and over, and we never learn.’349 Thus, a common appraisal of Clown Torture is that it 
is a vivid visual representation of absurdity, and this is achieved most significantly through 
repetition. 
 
Situations that do not Make Sense 
Nauman’s works can often be difficult to interpret, as though he aims to present 
situations that cannot be understood. Robert Silfkin refers to this as the artist’s ‘apparent 
semantic undecidability’, his refusal to provide a clear message to his work.350 Nauman too has 
mentioned that he aims to complicate meaning in his works by providing misleading, or 
incompatible content in order to frustrate the viewer’s reading. In the artist’s words, he is 
interested in the ‘tension of giving and taking away, of giving a certain amount of information 
and setting some kind of expectations and then not allowing them to be fulfilled, at least not in 
the sense that you expect… giving two kinds of information that don’t line up.’351 Nauman 
therefore sets up a situation where the constituent parts of his works allude to a potential 
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meaning that is ultimately unavailable to the viewer. He does this by deliberately making his 
works enigmatic, by removing the necessary information that would allow the viewer to make 
sense of it. In this manner, Nauman’s work imitates the condition of absurd—where meaning 
is sought but is impossible to discern. The viewer looks for a final and inherent meaning which 
is unavailable, and this is because they lack the resources to piece it together. Nauman’s works 
remind the viewer that existence is inherently problematic and uncertain.352 
The works that Nauman made in the 1990s are exemplary of his aim to conflate the 
viewer’s attempt to read them. His installation Shit in Your Hat/Head on a Chair (1990) (fig. 6) 
features a cast model of a human head affixed to a chair, suspended in the centre of the room, 
with a video projected onto the wall behind it. The video depicts a mime performing the 
spoken commands of an unseen man—his orders are both nonsensical and personally 
degrading, but the mime obeys diligently. His voice commands things like, ‘Sit on your hat, 
your hands on your head. Shit in your hat. Show me your hat. Put your hat on your head.’353 
The work is disconcerting, as there is no apparent association between the head on the hanging 
chair, the mime or the voice, yet all are installed together as though there is. As Morgan 
observes: ‘There is no resolution available. There is nothing to justify the action that stands 
before us… this absence of resolution [is] suggestive of the absurd.’354 Nauman creates a scene 
that prevents the viewer from ascertaining its meaning. It is the way that the work operates 
that is reminiscent of the absurd—rather than constructing an allegory in its content, it is the 
structure of the piece that is similar to the condition of absurdity. For Morgan, this more 
functional similarity makes Nauman’s absurd ‘systemic’—it is only when the work is 
contemplated in its entirety that this meaning becomes available, which is that its meaning is 
unavailable.355 In this manner, the lack of resolution implied by the absurd is not demonstrated 
or depicted, as in Nauman’s early performance videos (fig. 1-4). Here the absurd is mimicked 
in the way the work is comprehended by the viewer. The viewer looks for meaning in what 
they are experiencing, but this meaning is unavailable to them.  
 
Where possible I also aim to generate meaning with the form of my work as well as its content. The 
dull or minor activities of the task-based works are over-emphasised by the way they are produced (fig. 10-12, 
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14). Not only are the activities pointless, the way they are emphasised makes them seem more so. Thus, the 
form of the work adds as much to its meaning as its content. This is seen in the Dr Nobody series (2013-16) 
(fig. 13), which mimics the online videos of activist groups by copying their costume and using similar voice 
alteration in order to deliver a message. However, these elements of the videos are contradicted by my speeches, 
which relate minor observations, petty annoyances, and inane theories. The triviality of their content is 
exaggerated by the viewer’s expectation of weighty or arresting content. In other words, the combination of the 
form and content allows for their meaning to be understood. 
 
In another work Nauman presents the viewer with a more literal paradox. Discussing 
one of the artist’s sculptures, A rose has no teeth (1966) (fig. 7), Morgan notes how its 
construction of a logical contradiction suggests the absurd.356 The work is a curved rectangular 
plaque bearing the same phrase as its title—it is curved because Nauman initially installed it on 
a tree but later removed it.357 For Morgan, the vagueness of the assertion on the plaque is 
reminiscent of the absurd—it is an unsolvable problem that emphasises a lack of meaning.358 
Nauman borrowed the phrase from Ludwig Wittgenstein, who used it to illustrate that our 
understanding of language is based on assumed knowledge, and that our relation to language is 
from an internal loop. The phrase is only nonsensical if one knows that a rose has no teeth 
because it has no mouth, otherwise it would be assumed to be true.359 However Nauman’s 
interest in the phrase is much more simple, he uses it because it does not make sense.360 As 
with Shit in Your Hat (fig. 6), Nauman’s proposition of an unsolvable problem presents the 
absurd. For Morgan, the opacity of the sentence mimics the impossibility of understanding 
existence. Again Nauman’s work presents a problem with no solution, and this is the work’s 
ultimate meaning. 
If Nauman makes works that are only meaningful because they do not have an 
observable meaning, then the possibility arises that they are actually just meaningless. This 
problem is raised by Theodor Adorno in Aesthetic Theory (1970). Here Adorno considers the 
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apparent meaninglessness of Beckett’s work in a manner that can be applied to Nauman’s.361 
Importantly, he makes a distinction between meaninglessness addressed by works of art, and 
works of art that are meaningless. It is the same definition that separates the philosophical 
absurd and the absurd in a literal, vernacular sense. As he writes: ‘Beckett’s plays are absurd 
not because of the absence of any meaning, for then they would be simply irrelevant, but 
because they put meaning on trial.’362 Beckett’s characters are hopeless, their discourse and 
their actions amount to very little, and instead of an engaging plot the audience is presented 
with a repetition of banal days—yet this rigorous negation does not mean that the work is 
meaningless, because this is what the play is about. Beckett’s work has meaning because its 
subject is meaninglessness, and this is achieved through its form as well as its content. As 
Adorno puts it, Beckett’s works ‘gain their content through the negation of meaning.’363 Thus, 
it can be argued that the negation of meaning in works of art is the same as the affirmation of 
meaning, both are acts of communication and therefore meaningful.364 Using Adorno’s 
commentary it is possible to see how Nauman’s works function in much the same way. By his 
denial of an overt, decipherable message Nauman forces the viewer to conclude that the work 
is meaningless, and this is how he communicates the concept of meaninglessness.  
 
 My work also emphasises meaninglessness through its insistence on negation, which can be read as an 
expression of extreme pessimism. The futile acts depicted in my works are negations of useful ones, and their 
eventual resolution, even through failure or fatigue, is intentionally denied, as in the prolonged strain against rope 
attached to the ground in Earthmover (2007) (fig. 14). The presentation of my works often elicits frustration 
and disappointment, the attraction of bright colours and sound effects is opposed by the repetitive banality of my 
tasks, like the thumb-twiddling in What Have You (fig. 11). Similarly, Dr Nobody’s (fig. 13) aggressive 
appearance is in direct contrast to the platitudes he expresses. The emphasis on communication created by the 
mask, which encourages inhibition by concealing identity, and the subtitles, a method of ensuring that nothing is 
misunderstood, are undermined by the inanity of his confused theories, and his embarrassed hesitation to divulge 
them. This characteristic insistence on negation seems nihilistic, but I do not consider myself a nihilist. I am 
attracted to the absurd because it seems accurate to my condition, and even if this is taken as my sole compulsion 
it has inherent meaning in the same way as Beckett’s and Nauman’s work. 
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Costume, Role, and Universality 
It is quite common for writers and artists to describe absurdity as ubiquitous, because 
the same conditions that contribute to the absurd on a personal level apply to everyone.365 In 
Nauman’s video practice there is a noticeable move from works that he performs in to works 
that use actors. By removing himself from the work he makes the actions performed in his 
videos, as well as their concepts, more universal. Even in the early works (fig. 1-4) where 
Nauman himself performs, he aims to appear as neutral as possible. While these performances 
deal with his own experiences and ideas, his aim is to communicate these in a more universal 
manner. He treats his body more as a tool than a site of personality and subjectivity. In his 
own words, his performances were exercises in ‘making an examination of yourself and also 
making a generalisation beyond yourself.’366 The detached manner in which Nauman performs 
is how he achieves this generalisation. He performs his tasks in an expressionless, quiet, and 
casual manner that places focus on the act more than the artist.367  
 
I use costume to differentiate between myself and my performance personas. In task-based works (fig. 
10-12, 13) I wear a common business suit and tie to symbolise civilisation in general, or at least the West. 
Thus my actions become symbolic for a kind of collective agency. In the Dr Nobody series (fig. 13), I use 
costume and post production to obscure my identity as much as possible, but while it makes me anonymous, 
these devices have the curious effect of making my personality more prominent. This is because the costume has 
connotations of a certain type of behaviour that Dr Nobody does not exhibit, thus making his more conspicuous. 
Nevertheless, the purpose of this costume is still to make him more relatable, precisely because he does not live up 
to it. His problems and complaints are everyday and common, even if they seem pathetic in context.   
 
Apart from his early performances Nauman rarely features in his video works, 
choosing instead to employ actors (fig. 5, 6, 9). By using other people Nauman completely 
removes any association with his personality, but in certain works (fig. 5) he takes this further 
by dressing his actors as clowns, and thus removes any association with their personality as 
well. As mentioned earlier, what interests Nauman about the figure of the clown is its 
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anonymity, its reference to humanity in general.368 The clown’s costume makes it seem less like 
an individual person, and more like a character, a role that is transferrable and therefore not 
related to the person performing it. It is this aspect of clowns that makes them seem artificial, 
but it is this artificiality that makes them recognisable, because it is what makes them 
transferrable and common.369 Clowns are anonymous, and their familiarity enhances this 
anonymity—they are famous for being no one in particular. In the circus its only function is a 
comic interlude, where it is employed to fill time between acts. Clowns engage in idle play 
between the main events, achieving nothing, and thus represent the frivolity of human 
endeavour. Due to their role we expect them to partake in nonsensical and trivial dialogues, 
petty squabbles, and attempt ridiculous tasks, but at the same time they remind us of our 
own.370 As Schaffner notes: ‘we are invited to experience through our identification with the 
clown and clownish nonsense not just a silly lack of sense, but the more subversive potential 
of things actually failing to make sense.’371 The clown’s world is an exaggerated version of the 
real one, which makes just as little sense, although less obviously. Because we can see ourselves 
in the figure of the clown, its nonsensical world symbolises ours.   
Like Nauman, Ugo Rondinone also uses clowns for their symbolism, but to rather 
different ends. In his videos, sculptures, and performances, Rondinone flips our expectation 
that clowns should be lively and entertaining by depicting the opposite. One of the videos in 
his installation Where Do We Go From Here? (1996) (fig. 8) features a clown slumped against a 
white backdrop. As though exhausted or drunk, with its legs outstretched, the figure listlessly 
stares into the distance beyond the camera. The shot is taken from behind the soles of the 
clown’s shoes, in a direct reference to the video in Clown Torture (fig. 5) where a clown pretends 
to be tickled. But rather than enacting comic antagonism, Rondinone’s clown is apathetic—
instead of artifice and spectacle, the clown represents banality and melancholia.372 Where 
Nauman uses the clown to point out that our everyday lives are underscored by nonsense, 
Rondinone points out that this is accompanied by fatigue.373  
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Frustration 
In a frequently quoted and uncharacteristically candid interview, Nauman explains that 
feelings of exasperation inspire many of his works. As he says to Joan Simon: ‘Anger and 
frustration are two very strong feelings of motivation for me. They get me into the studio, get 
me to do the work.’374 This anger and frustration is not entirely the product of his method, 
although it involves considerable struggle, nor is it the same frustration his viewers experience 
when they encounter seemingly pointless, repetitive, and incoherent artworks. Rather, 
Nauman’s frustration is at human nature. As he goes on to state: ‘My work comes out of being 
frustrated about the human condition. And about how people refuse to understand other 
people. And about how people can be cruel to each other. It’s not that I think I can change 
that, but it’s just a frustrating part of human history.’375 Nauman made these comments shortly 
after discussing his reading into accounts of torture in South and Central America, and how it 
affected his practice at the time. This was in the late 1970s, and while his sentiments seem 
specific to that point it is worth noting that many of his works are motivated by a frustration 
that comes from his inability to understand a particular problem. For example, his early work 
was informed by his struggle with the ambiguous notion of the work of art, and the role of the 
artist in making it. In Nauman’s work after 1980 this focus seems to shift to the problem of 
trying to understand human behaviour and the frustration that this involves. 
It is a result of this frustration that Nauman’s work represents the absurd, because it is 
the product of his attempt to grasp something that resists understanding. Two of his works 
that best represent absurdity, Clown Torture and Shit in Your Hat (fig. 5 and 6), foreground 
purposeless and inexplicable activity. They present vivid visual metaphors for absurd human 
life, vain and unjustified, but their manner is more aggressive than his early studio 
performances. These works are driven by anger, the cause of which is the meaningless violence 
of which people are capable.376 For Nauman, what is absurd is the fact that humankind 
continues to oppress, exploit, torture, and murder itself despite our foreknowledge of the 
consequences. As Storr notes: ‘The repeated inability to learn from mistakes is a constant issue 
for Nauman; no design for betterment or punishment for failure changes the odds against 
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error. Pain is a poor teacher—or perhaps we are suffering’s dunces.’377 Nauman’s art refers to 
the paradox of our simultaneous self-awareness and lack of self-control, it reminds us that 
while there is abundant proof of civilisation’s indiscretions they nevertheless continue to occur. 
His work is his reaction to the cruelty, intolerance, and stupidity he perceives in humans, and it 
shares the pointlessness, repetition and frustration that characterise absurdity.378 
Although Nauman’s works seem to share a view that human nature is irrational and 
unpredictable, not all of them focus on violence and cruelty. For example, the subject of his 
1991 video installation, Anthro/Socio (Rinde Facing Camera) (fig. 9), is the complexity of human 
thought and behaviour, and particularly how difficult they are to understand despite our best 
efforts. The work is not subtle in its address of the social sciences, which are mentioned in 
both the title and the work itself. Products of the Enlightenment, anthropology and sociology 
are means by which we try to understand our condition and the way that we live—they are 
exercises in empirical self-examination.379 But even though the practice of these disciplines is 
rigorous and structured, Nauman’s installation is a reminder that their subject is fundamentally 
unpredictable. Here the viewer is confronted with three large-scale video projections and three 
pairs of television monitors, each alternately placed upside down or right-way up and playing 
either one of two short videos. The screens show a close up of the head of performance artist 
Rinde Eckert as he gazes into the camera, bellowing the following phrases: ‘Feed Me/Eat 
Me/Anthropology’, ‘Help Me/Hurt Me/Sociology’, and ‘Feed Me/Help Me/Eat Me/Hurt 
Me’.380 Eckert’s vocals sound like Gregorian chants as he alternates between pitches, which 
make the combination of commands and pleas sound both anxious and powerful.381 Since all 
of the monitors and projections are playing at once, they combine to make a complicated and 
disorienting mix of surety and insecurity. Through this complex and random layering of tone 
and message, and despite the conviction of the phrases and the way they are put forward, the 
work exemplifies the complexity of human behaviour and how difficult it is to account for.  
Because Anthro/Socio seems to represent human experience so well, many consider it to 
be Nauman’s portrait of humanity, and one that does not omit its flaws. Arthur Danto 
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applauds the humanism of the work, finding it moving and tremendous.382 For him the ringing 
voice of the installation seems like ‘the Voice of Humanity’.383 The work addresses many 
aspects of human experience at once, such as exasperation, rage, confusion, and anxiety. But 
while Danto sees the work as celebratory, Storr is more cautious. He writes that ‘a disabused 
humanism—rather than anti-humanism—is at the core of Nauman’s enterprise.’384 Storr 
acknowledges that Nauman’s work is far from idealistic, but neither is it dismissive of the 
human subject. When he makes a work like Anthro/Socio, which has the human experience as 
its sole focus, it necessarily involves inconsistencies. The multiple, simultaneous, and 
contradictory assertions made by a single man in Anthro/Socio refer to the uncertainty and 
inconsistency of our thought and behaviour. The disabused humanism that Storr refers to is 
Nauman’s apparent disillusionment with the idea that we can overcome our innate drives and 
desires, and the problems that these cause, just by studying ourselves.385 These aspects of our 
behaviour and thought are inextricable from human experience, and as such a fundamental 
quality of the human condition is that it cannot be fully explained. 
 Nauman is frustrated with human behaviour because it resists understanding, and he 
voices this frustration in his work. Similarly, his early work struggles with the uncertainty of 
artistic purpose after modernism. Like the meaning of life, these ideas are vague and shifting, 
and the attempt to define them with logic results in frustration and failure. This is why 
Nauman’s work is so vividly absurd, why many commentators have noticed this similarity, and 
why it has such an affinity with Beckett’s writing. Through his work, Nauman doubts our 
mastery of our faculties, such as communication, perception, and reason.386 Thus, he stresses 
our limitation. Nevertheless, in the same way that Camus insists we should keep the absurd 
alive with a constant struggle to defy it, Nauman remains committed to his project despite its 
futility.  
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Conclusion 
 
By the special examination of the work of four individuals this thesis has argued that 
the absurd is still relevant after modernism, despite its close association with humanist, 
existentialist, and modernist discourse. In doing so, it has aimed to enrich the concept by 
demonstrating its resonance with aspects of the contemporary, which, despite being more 
immediate, are still pressing concerns of humanity and are a central motivation for my practice. 
Across all the examples discussed, the absurd is characterised by the inability to understand 
existence and underscores its inherent meaninglessness, leaving the subject with a sense of 
futility and a lack of agency. The present study has demonstrated how these conditions reflect 
in the work of Søren Kierkegaard, Albert Camus, Michel Houellebecq, and Bruce Nauman. 
These figures were chosen for their suitability to the themes explored in the thesis and also 
their representation of a chronology from the inception of the concept through to the 
contemporary.  
Despite Kierkegaard being the first philosopher to use the term ‘absurd’, the meaning 
of the term is not explicitly stated within his main texts. Therefore, a primary definition of the 
absurd necessitates a rather comprehensive approach, since the absurd has a pivotal role in his 
overall project. The absurd in his work describes the point at which the necessary conditions 
for faith are rejected by the objective mind, and faith becomes impossible. This definition is 
accurate to all instances of the term in Kierkegaard’s work, whereas other commentaries on 
Kierkegaard’s work argue that the irrational assertions of dogma (such as the incarnation, or 
the ‘absolute paradox’) are the same as the absurd. Due to the absurd, Kierkegaard argues that 
the only way that Christian faith can be achieved is to circumvent reason, to embrace the 
objective uncertainty of subjective existence in order to commit to a more existential type of 
faith. Kierkegaard asserts that this is the highest condition that one can achieve, but that it is 
also extremely difficult. In order to explain this, he uses several exemplars such as Knight of 
Faith and the biblical figure Abraham to emphasise the commitment and sacrifice that is 
necessary to achieve and sustain true faith. Kierkegaard also explains the importance of the 
absurd to faith with his idea of the spheres of existence. The lowest of these is the aesthetic, 
which is characterised by despair. This can either take the form of an unthinking way of life 
where the pleasures that drive it can easily be lost, or in the form of a more existential despair 
at the meaninglessness of existence. The highest sphere is the religious, and the absurd acts as 
a barrier between it and the aesthetic. Only a leap of faith can allow one to leave the aesthetic 
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sphere. Kierkegaard argues that if faith is not possible, due to the absurd, then life is always 
lived in the aesthetic sphere and therefore is always in despair. 
Camus’s definition of the absurd is essentially similar to Kierkegaard’s, but differs in 
context. Both writers assert that the absurd is an obstacle to the meaning of life, and that it 
leads to despair. Kierkegaard uses this despair to justify faith, but in Camus’s work it is used to 
explain the need for a sense of individual and collective agency. This philosophy evolves from 
his early to his later works. Camus’s early work explores the various ways that one can live with 
this despair, which he calls absurdity. In The Myth of Sisyphus he begins with the problem of 
suicide, and deems that this is not an acceptable solution to the absurd because it evades the 
problem rather than solving it. He then outlines a number of ways that one can live with the 
absurd, but these all involve a more or less amoral, or nihilistic, sensibility. Because one does 
not attach significance to ethical codes or behavioural norms, this kind of approach to life is 
alienated. Camus explores these ideas in his novel, The Outsider. In his later work The Rebel, 
Camus develops his concept of metaphysical revolt. Because the absurd is oppression the only 
way to oppose it is through defiance. Since all humans desire justice against the absurd, the 
pursuit of collective justice can make our lives meaningful. This approach is foundational to 
Camus’s later philosophy of Absurdism, and he portrays it allegorically in his novel The Plague, 
where the citizens of a town beset by an infectious disease work together to resist it. 
Houellebeq’s writing is used to situate the absurd in the contemporary. While it follows 
the same tradition as Camus, Houellebecq’s work lacks any sense of heroism or ethic. Rather, 
his novels emphasise how the conditions of Western society make individual life prone to 
absurdity. These conditions have the same root causes as the absurd. After the decline of 
religion, the rise of Enlightenment values of individual reason and autonomy evolved into 
simple self-interest. This heightened form of individualism has led to the dissolution of social 
and familial bonds, and as a result people are alienated and lonely. Houellebecq’s novel 
Atomised emphasises the detrimental effects of this phenomenon, particularly how self-interest 
exacerbates his characters’ unhappiness and contributes to their view that life is meaningless. 
In Houellebecq’s universe, contemporary society has become dominated by capitalism. 
Individuals treat one another much like exchange commodities, and the desire for beauty, 
wealth, and youth can never be adequately met. For Houellebecq, the attempt to remedy the 
crisis of contemporary Western society requires drastic changes to its structure, and even the 
human genome. However, his writing frequently emphasises how this is either doomed to 
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failure or highly unlikely. In the work of Houellebecq the absurd still involves the inability to 
find meaning in life, but its causes are more immediate and his conclusions are less optimistic. 
The work of Nauman is another example of the absurd after modernism, and the 
exclusive case study of his practice was necessary due to its thorough engagement with the 
absurd as well as the affinity between his performance practice and the studio work. This 
affinity is not only philosophical. Both the studio work and Nauman’s engage methodologies 
involving manipulation of video documentation, slapstick, endurance, and a prominent use of 
costume. There are further connections to be made between the use of masks in both 
practices, but given the strong tradition of scholarship in this area its discussion was omitted to 
avoid being too brief. Instead the chapter focused on the prominent absurdist attitudes in his 
oeuvre. Much like in the work of Houellebecq, Nauman’s absurd comes from frustrations that 
are more immediate than the meaning of life, but still pertain to important problems of life. 
Early in his career he devoted himself to the problem of the role of the artist and the nature of 
art. His inability to solve it led him to decide that if art, and as a result the artist, has no 
purpose, then his role was to seek to define that purpose over and over. This concept is very 
similar to Camus’s idea of revolt, because it involves a constant struggle to define meaning, and 
that the only meaning one can find is in the struggle itself. Due to the abundant themes of 
pointlessness, frustration, and use of repetition in his work, many commentators have 
compared it with the absurd as well as with Samuel Beckett’s writing. Nauman’s work cannot 
be ascribed with a desire for existential meaning in the same sense as Camus’s, yet his practice 
has always been characterised by an attraction to the incomprehensible. In later works he turns 
his focus to the complexity and unpredictability of human behaviour and experience, creating 
installations that are equally difficult to account for. Through his work, Nauman emphasises 
the limitations of our capacity to define ourselves. He stresses this impossibility in a way that 
recalls the absurd, but induces astonishment rather than despair. 
 These four case studies have attempted to extract a central point: the acute perception 
of the absurdity of life comes from a sense of existential solitude, but it is by defining and 
defying this feeling that it is possible to live with it. Kierkegaard’s work deals with his difficulty 
to connect with a system of belief that gives one a profound sense of belonging and 
meaning—and without which life is despair. Camus uses this lack of an inherent meaning to 
make the case for a new, shared ethic of responsibility and duty. For Houellebecq, it is 
precisely due to this absence of community and meaning that the world has become so 
miserable. He insists on the vapidity of life, nevertheless it is enshrined within a coherent work 
97 
 
of art. Similarly, Nauman’s work takes his struggle to define his existence as both its motivating 
principle and subject. In this way he moves beyond his own contingency and makes work that 
is communicative, even celebratory. It is fitting that Kierkegaard deemed the aesthetic to be 
the meaningless dead end of life without religion, since it is the aesthetic that gives the absurd 
its redemption. 
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Images 
 
 
Figure 1. Bruce Nauman, Walking in an Exaggerated Manner Around the Perimeter of a Square, 
1967-68, 16mm film transferred to video (black and white, silent), 10 min, Courtesy of 
Electronic Arts Intermix, New York. 
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Figure 2. Bruce Nauman, Playing A Note on the Violin While I Walk Around the Studio, 1967-68, 
16mm film transferred to video (black and white, sound), 10 min, Courtesy of Electronic Arts 
Intermix, New York. 
 
Figure 3. Bruce Nauman, Bouncing Two Balls Between the Floor and Ceiling with Changing Rhythms, 
1967-68, 16mm film transferred to video (black and white, sound), 10 min, Courtesy of 
Electronic Arts Intermix, New York. 
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Figure 4. Bruce Nauman, Slow Angle Walk (Beckett Walk), 1968, Video (black and white, 
sound), 60 min, Courtesy of Electronic Arts Intermix, New York. 
 
 
Figure 5. Bruce Nauman, Clown Torture, 1987, Six channel video (colour, sound, two 
projections, four monitors), 62 min (length of longest video), The Art Institute of Chicago. 
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Figure 6. Bruce Nauman, Shit in Your Hat/Head on a Chair, 1990, Video projection, chair, wax 
head, screen and steel cable, Dimensions variable, Collection of Contemporary Art Fundació 
‘la Caixa’, Barcelona. 
 
Figure 7. Bruce Nauman, A rose has no teeth, 1966, Lead plaque, 19 x 20.4 x 5.6cm, Daros 
collection, Switzerland. 
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Figure 8. Ugo Rondinone, Where Do We Go From Here?, 1996, Four channel video (colour, 
sound), Various durations, Fond National d’art contemporain, Paris. 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Bruce Nauman, Anthro/Socio (Rinde Facing Camera), 1991, Six channel video (colour, 
sound), Various durations, Cartier Foundation, Paris. 
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Figure 10. Paul Mumme, Man with Umbrella, 2005, Standard definition video (colour, sound), 
Infinite loop, Courtesy of the artist. 
 
 
Figure 11. Paul Mumme, What Have You, 2015, High definition video (colour, sound), Infinite 
loop, Courtesy of the artist. 
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Figure 12. Paul Mumme, Something from Nothing, 2015, High definition video (colour, sound), 
Infinite loop, Courtesy of the artist. 
 
 
Figure 13. Paul Mumme, Green Bags (from the Dr Nobody series), 2013, Webcam video (colour, 
sound), 8:16 min, Courtesy of the artist. 
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Figure 14. Paul Mumme, Earthmover, 2007, High Definition Video (colour, sound), Infinite 
loop, Courtesy of the artist. 
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